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PREFACE 
This thesis has been prepared in recognition of the increas-
ing attention given to the installation ot incentives tor indir-
ect labor. In past years, the great bulk ot labor was that on 
the production line, namely, direot labor. output was low and 
methods were slow, result1ng in relatively low indirect labor 
requirements to provide service to the manufacturing group. 
Now, with expanding indirect f'unll'tlons in relation to the 
d1reot functions and a high degree of control of the dlrect 
production areas, management is turning its attentlon to the 
lndlrect groups, who hlthertofore, were controlled merely by 
using whatever quantlties of people were required to get the job 
done. 
This thesls recognizes many of the ways that management is 
now oontrolllng the required quant1ties of 1ndirect labor through 
the use ot incentives. 
Very special thanks are due those ind1viduals and companies 
who provided detailed insight into their handling of incentives 
for indirect labor. Their request for anonimity will be honored 
throughout this thesls. 
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OHAPTER I 
INTRODUOTION 
The pUrPose of this paper 1s to tell what has been done and 
is now beln~ done in the field of indirect incentives, what types 
of occupations ma.y be covered with incent1ves, and the yardsticks 
used to measure production for the various occupat1ons constitut--
in~ the ~oups called ind1rect labor. l Many articles have been 
written and talks Jl:1ven. tel11ng of various indirect groups that 
have been covered with incentives. For some of the categories to 
be covered, the measurements and applications from one Jl:roup to 
another are similar. Similar incentives may be appl1ed 1n other 
industries with little dev1at1on. However, for other types of 
1ndirect labor groUDS, the measurements used for incent1ves w1ll 
be greatly varied from one ;(roup to the next. Although several 
d1fferent types of measurements w1ll be reflected in the chapters 
to follow, they may reflect l1ttle more than sample possib1lities 
to anyone intending to apply standards to an indirect labor greup, 
ii ... 
1 •. Indirect labor may be defined as those individuals or 
groups who do not by their own physical efforts affect the quality 
or form of the produet, but do perform work in connection with the 
'Product. Oareful avoidance of the term "indirect incentives,:" bas· 
been exercised.. An lndlrect incentive is one which measures the 
worker with a factor over which he has virtually no control. In--
cent1ves for ind1rect labor may be either indirect incentives or 
direct incentives. Direct incentives are established on aea81s 
of a givenquahtity of work that is recognized as assignable 
directly to a group or individual. 
1 
2 
since the nature ot organizations may. vary so greatly. 
OOcu'Dations Included. The breakdown of the occU'oationa 
included is a categor1zin~ wh1ch reflects 1ndustry in general. No 
lndustry wlll have all of the groups lncluded. and certalnly. the 
measurements would not be applicable to s1mllar occupations in 
other llcations. Moat industries will have several of the occu-
patlons 'Dresented. Some lndustries having the same occupations, 
may cate~orlze them as direct labor, auch as a mail order houae, 
where order flllers pick orders ready for shipment, this being the 
bep;lnning and end pl'oduct, rather than a step of the productlon 
process. Although, this type of activity is considered as a bus-
iness, rather than an 1ndust.ry~ many of the occupat1ons which 
occur in it, would appear in 1ndustries. 
Off1ce bus1nessea, such as insurance companies or banks 
'Oresent another type of labor wh1ch tldo not by their own effort·s 
affect the Quality or form ott a 'Dl'oduct. These p;%"C\)ups 1tl factor-
ies would perf'o.rm cler1cal or non-superv1sory staff funct10ns and 
w1ll represent the f1rst group to be 1ncludedin this paper •. 
S1nce the product generally handled by th1s ~up 1s paperwork, 
the method of estab11sh1ng ind1rect 1ncent1ves will 1n many 
s1tuat1ons be app11cable to the strictly 'Oaperwork ~enerat1ng 
enterprises. Th1s category w1l1 1nclude such graups as Indust.r1al 
Eng1neer1ng. Industr1al Relat10ns people, Account1ng people, 
Eng1neers, Draftsmen, Productlon Control people, Secretarles, 
Typlsts"and Clerks. Their superv1sors will also be lncluded.~ 
Great care has been taken ln g1 v111g examples ef the occupatlons 
> 
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1n this group to 1nclude only "front off1ce" type occupat1ons. 
Cler1cal funct1ons, such as T1mekeepers, Mi.ll Clerks and Recorders 
of va.rious types w1~1 be considered 1n a more appropr1ate cate-
gory of !tiM1reet jobs 1n the faotory~ FUrther analyaea and break! 
downs of these groups, and even sub-oatagorles, where d1fferences 
w111 affect the measurements w11~ be expressed 1n Chapter"<II deal-
1n~ w1th these general cate~or1es. 
The tollow1n~ chapter w111 deal with ind1rect jobs 1n the 
tactory, ~ namely those jobs in the 'Drev1ous paragraph when perform-
ed 1n d1reot conjunct1on with the faotory and at the s1te 01' 
manufacture. Also inoluded 1n this chapter w111 be those tactory 
"unmeasurable10bs:2 so oalled, beoause of the ~eneral unrepet1-
t1veness of the work. one suoh group 1s ma1ntenance, others are 
paok1ng, sh1pp1ng, reoe1v1ng, 1nspect1on, test1ng and trouble-
shoot1ng, and speo1al construot10n crews. Ms..terial handlers, set-
up men, stock room people and others may be less repet1t1ve baaed 
on the degree of 1nd1v1dua11ty of the produot as may ooour 1n a 
job shop operat1on. 
The last group to be d1scussed 1s that of management, namely, 
the measurement of the superv1sors 01' all of the aforement1oned 
categories 1n add1t10n to the company's execut1ves and Foremen 01' 
the d1rect labor crewa. 
Advantages !! Incent1ves !2! Indireot Labor. Some 01' the 
2. V1rg1l Rotroft, "Now Those Unmeasurable Jobs are Meas--
urable~ Faotory, axvII (February, 1959)~ 192-193 •. 
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advantages ot incentives tor indirect labor become increas1ngly 
apparent from read1ng a l1st wb.1ch one company's Industrial 
Eng1neer1ng Department recently included 1n a carefully formulated 
program to sell management on the v1rtues of installing an incen-
ti ve in a 'P.rticular area. This area was the first area in 
indirect 1ncent1ves 1n that particular companv:\., ill that the only 
other type. of measurements previously used were nf the indirect 
type. 
Advantage.,!. !l! Indirect':, Wage Incentives 
l~. To ach1eve maximum interest in individual workers, 
in order to seCllnl contz'ibut1ons to better depart-
ment use of labor. work area and material, and 
thereby improve the d1v1sion's cost performance. 
2. To provide a more scientific approach 1n control-~ 
lin~ indirect labor costs than the mere acceptance 
of a "favorable trend: 
3. Such a "yardstick" will rel1eve upper mana~ement 
of the burden of closely scrutinizing the amount 
ot labor in these ~u'ps. 
4. It will provide appreciable savings by maintain--
i~ the hours of indirect work at a minimum. 
5. Area management w1l1 be relieved of the burden of 
expla1ning "too many peo'Dle" or plead1ng for addi--
tional people believed to be required 1n the div1--
sion. 
6. They provide an impetus to management to reduce lag-
time in reducing indirect labor in prO'Der relation-
ship to direct labor. 
7. To enable maximum product1 ve 'Performance ot the 
d1rect operations. 
At th1s t1me, th1s particular 1ndirect labor problem 
w11l cease to exist as a problem. The sole judgement 
easily made of ut1lizat1on ot these ind1rect labor 
groUPS w111 be "area management 1s do1ng 1ts job" or 
1s not do1ng 1ts job~3 
5 
The advantages listed, present many obv1ous 1mp11cat1ons. In 
the f1rst advantage 11sted, of ach1ev1ng "max1mum 1nterest 1n 
1nd1v1dual workers: the bas1c self preser~at1on that most rat10nal 
humans posess 1s reflected. It s1mpry po1nts out that the employ-
ees w1ll rece1ve added ccmnensat10n for added work and Will be 
recognized for both poor and acceptable quant1ties of work. The 
standard, in whatever form 1t exists" although 1t may in many 
c~ses not be po1nted toward anyone 1ndiv1dual, w111 1nd1cate the 
company's expectat10ns by reco~iz1ng the hundred ner cent pertor-
mance mark. 
Item two refers to the fact that a pre-formulated method of 
calculati~ standard performance, is far better than the company's 
execut1ves being sat1sf1ed w1th a lower ratio of indirect to 
direct labor than has existed previously or maklng abstract 
judgements that quantities of ind1rect labor may seem too great. 
The th1rd statement 1ndicates the difficult1es 1mpl1ed 1n 
the second statement, that upper management has to guess and judge 
on the bas1s of lim1ted facts, what quant1t1es of ind1rect labor 
are required. In th1s statement 1s 1ndicated that management 
may look merely at a performance, with perhaps a few s1mple 
implications, to determine that ind1rect labor in a given area 1s. 
or 1s not dOing 1ts job. This would be far s1mpler than the 
3. The company whose document was the source of this quote 
wished to rema1n anonymous. 
intensive inquisitions requi1"ed wlthout suoh mea.sures. 
The fifth item is an answer; to the third whereby lower 
management does not have to satisfy the whims of upper management 
in its allowable and acceptable quantities ot personnel. Area 
supervision with the aid of incentives tor its indireot people 
may judge objectively it the people in the area are not working 
hard enough, or perbaDs. if additional personnel are needed. 
6 
When the standard indicates that considerably more people would 
be warranted by the number of standard hours, bonus or other 
measure used. the supervisor may Simply increase his toroe. This 
is possible, of course, assuming that poor performanoe by the 
ob.1ective measure does not come as a result of the force increase. 
The sixth advantage reflects deeply seated implications. 
Previously, before/the installation of indirect incentives, in the 
area included in the report, management could not tell what effect 
the increase or decrease of labor had on the 1mmed1ate future ot 
the area. As a result of the indirect incentive and caretul 
study by the Industrial Engineers, the reqUirements, as a result 
ot the affect of changes in the related direct labor force were 
made evident. Thus, indirect supervisors could follow the formula 
objectively instead of waiting to see what would happen. 
The maintaining of "indirect work hours at a minimum" is self 
evident in its purpose as the basic reason for any type ot incen-
tive installation--to use less man hours to do the job. 
The last item "to enable maximum productive performanoe of the 
direct o'Oeration" suits the definition previously given of work 
> 
performed "1n conjunct1on w1th the product~ In the paper quoted 
tor discusslon are lncluded materlal handllng and set-up occu-
patlons .• whlch by thelr nature are those which keep the 11nes 
rolllng. If these occupat.iona are not provldlng the material to 
be worked on andaLso clearing the assembly llne for contlnued 
production" the direct crews performance would surely suffer. 
Even more lndlrectly, the same may be said for amlntenance men, 
who keep the machlnes runnlng and the factory ln good mechan1cal 
conditlon. Industr1al Eng1neers, who provlde the best working 
methods, the janitors, who prov1de the surround1ngs for a better 
worklng atmosphere, etc. 
In another report, many of the ldeas of the above are re-
lterated as reasons why there should be 1ncentlves: 
As an a1d ln meetlng our hlgh performance stand--
ards, we have stressed the systematl0 use of faots to 
sharpen managerlal and supervlsor'Y judgement. As a 
speolfl0 example, we have ooncent.rated on the use of 
tlmestudy and other forms of work measurement to lm-
prove performanoe through lnoreaslng effic1enoy. 
Our work ln thls f1eld ls almed at providlng 
management and supervls10n wlth performance yard-
stloks and other alds whloh they oan use to lmprove 
thelr operatlons. Partly as a result of our efforts 
ln thls area, we have atta1ned a favorable oompetlt-
lve posltlon ln the 1ndustry whlle at the same tlme 
provid1ng thousands of jobs at good wages and out--
stand1ng fringe beneflts for our people. 
Now however, the profits of our Company and the jobs of our people are belng4threatened by ever-lncreaslng oompetltlon • • • 
4. The Management Consultant flrm whose work on a SUpe£-
vlsory Ilanual ls shown here w1shes to remaln anonymous. 
I 
! 
In still another manual for a different group by the same 
consult-ant firm it 1s stat.ed that the indirect incentive. were£ 
flUi tiated primarily to supply departments wi tb. a meaBS 01' eval-
uating performance from the standpoint of utilization 01' manpower 
and accompli sb.ment of work assignments. The pJ"ogram will also 
assist in the control of cleri,cal costs, the determination of 
personnel requirements and in other related areas:5 
Still another report states that thelr~anager's purpose 1s 
to plan clerical costs more adequa.tely and to compel. perfonnance 
to contorm to plan more precisely:6 This item reflects similar 
think1ng to thate iD1J>l'1ed in items two, four, and. tive of the first 
set of advantages listed. 
The toregoing advantages are aimed at the l'ower echelon 
people,. In another analysis aimed at management incentives, added 
advantages as well as overlapping can eas11y be seen. 
An effective aUEervlao,rf incentive Pl!O~ram controls iiiiniitacturlns costs--eu s them and hoI s them down and 
- at an expense, thit"s 1,8S,S than the savings. 
It ¥rov1dea & Earellel means 01' maintaining a EroEer 
!It erentlal-between the earnIngs of supervisors and sup_· 
ervlaed.. That appl'les especially where there is an' 
incentive tor the workers. 
A supervisory incentive htlPS draw the lower echelon 
it supervision closer to he core-o?:management. It 
SIves them some financIil-staKe:rn-Succesifui oper-
ations •. 
5. Ibid., Procedure Manual •. 
-
6. Billy E •. Goetz,~ "Planning and Controllins Routine Cler1cal 
Costs~ Advanced Management, XXIII (October 1958), 23. 
It Irov1dee ~ means of comparing performances !! ~­
arv dual superv1sors for development and promot1on 
programs. 
l! helps 1ntegrate !h! contr1bution 1! operat1ons 2l 
serv1ce and s;aff departments·tIf they are 1ncluded 
in the plan). 
9 
Another period1cal art1c1e 1n the same aer1es as that above, 
suggest the same advantages as the f1rst four just ment1oned, plus 
the added advantages: 
It's as much of an 1ncant1 ve during periods ot slack 
iiiCrl'ow ProCiu'Ctl'iii as when th1ngs are humm1ng. ThSOt ' a 
IiiiPorEint~~ we th1tlk-;-because we are Just as anx10us 
(1t not more so) to 1nsp1re efflc1ency when we're 
staring a loss 1n to face as we are dur1ng lush perlods.8 
The last serles ot advantages 1s h1ghllghted by answering the 
quest1on, "Why do we have th1s plan? Because management was oon-
v1nced that the l1ne supervlsors could cut and control cost • ..,..if' 
stimulated by proper 1ncentlve:9 
Pr1mar1ly, per1od1cal l1.terature has been used 1n th1s study. 
S1nce the field is fairly new, not texts have been wr1tten as yet. 
Var10us compan1es have prov1ded the author with the1r processes 
and formulae used in the development of their 1ncentive appliea--
t1ons. 
7. Robert S.Rioe, "Incent1~es for Supervi80rs~ Factory, 
CX! (July 1953), 97. -
8. J. E. Heldgen and Hiley Davis, "Incentives for Middle 
Management~ Factory, OXI (July 1953), 98. 
9. George E •. McCarthy and John J. P10car, "Control Costs 
with SUperv1sor's Incent1ves~ Factory, OXI (July 1953), 103. 
CHAPTER II 
INCENTIVES FOR CLERICAL AND NON-SUPERVISORY STAFF GROUPS 
Levela'IfiolUded. Th1s chapter 1s conoerned w1th 1ncent1ves 
tor clerical and non-superv1sory sta~f groups. IU may be sa1d that 
th1s group 1s the ~rthest, most 1n d1rect group 1n relat10n to 
the d1rect product1on.. Ind1rect labor 1n the ~actory works 
adjacent to and 1n d1rect connect1on w1th the d1rect factory peo-
ple. The management group 1s composed o~ the d1rect labor work-
ers' superv1sors and the1r assoc1a.tes. The cler1cal group, as 
1ncluded here cons1sts ot the non-superv1sory, tront-ott1ce 
workers. Table I, toll.owing,coyers the 1ncent1ve 1n.tallat1ons to 
be d1scussed 1n the ahapter. 
TABLE I 
INCENTIVE PLANS DISCUSSED IN THIS CHAPTER 
Plan No. OCcupat1ons Covered (Company) Page References 
1. Miscellaneous Cler1cal (P1tney Bowea) 11,.13, 15, 18 
19, 21, 25. 
2. " All Otf1ce and Cler1cal (Anonymous 16, 25. 
Consultant Developed Plan) 
3. SUperv1sors, Lower Management and 12, 14, 18, 24, 
Cler1cal(Amer1can Seat1ng) 26, 29, 75, 79, 
88. 
4. Cler1cal Operat1on.(r~cro Sw1tch) 15, 16. 
10 
11 
Slnce this group conslsts ln large part of women offlce work-
ers, the motlvatlon to perform at a hlgher than average rate ls 
by and large less than that of the factory or management groups. 
Thls ls true because the women workers aue neltber supportlng fam-
ll1es, as a general rule, or seeklng to advance ln the business 
world as are the factory workers and members of management 
respectlvely. 
Gllbert Brooks, Chief Tlme Study Engtneer of the Pltney Bowes 
Company recosn1zes the sensitlv1ty of women off1ce workers in bls 
statement which follows: "The technlcal problems of clerlcal work 
measurement can be solved by any good lndust,rialenglneer trained 
ln tbe fleld of sbop incentlve prlnclples, however, lt requlres an 
exceptlonally good lndustrial englneer wl th plenty of tact, and 
dlplomacy to take on the Job of condltlonlng the offlce employees 
to tlme measurements~l 
Tbe job of se1l1ng incentlves to workers ls tbe most dltt1cul1 
1n thls area, net only because of the sensltivlty mentloned above, 
of women otfloe workers, but because of professlonal prlde in tbe 
male workers. Also, the trad1tion of no t1me clock and the salary 
basls of pay, welghs heavlly agalnst recelvlng a favorable welcome 
ln the lnsta1latlon of offloe lncentlves. Factory workers may 
not reslst lncentlves, on an 1ndlvldual basls, besldes the fact 
that lncentlves are more or less, tradlt10na1ly acceptable ln the 
1. Gllbert Brooks, "Measur1ng Oftice Operatlons for Incentlve 
Unpubllshed works from an address to the Elghth Annual Systems 
Meetlng, Detrolt, Michlgan. (October 1955), 2. 
---
12 
tactory. 
Reoognizing the always wise approach of letting the people 
know what you have 1n mind when changes are to be ma4e, . Mr. Brooks 
and h1s Industrial Engineers carefully explained his objectives to 
the first pilot group in his cler1cal inoent1ve installat10n 
(~lan No. l). Th1s was done by ". • • hold1ng a series of meet-
ings with the supervisors and the employees. At these meetings 
we explained the funct10n at time study, showed how t1me stud1es 
were taken, how we plotted our elemental time, values 1n order to 
arr1ve at the standard t1mes and showed them samplet1me studies. 
Atter these meet1ngs we made a point o~ sitting down with each 
operator and again explain1ng our function, • .. 2 • • 
.. 
The above approach was a direct one trom and company's Indus-
trla1 Engineering group to their fellow employees 1n another: 
depart.ment. Another organiza'ttion handled the installa.tion of 
clerical and off1ce incentives (Plan No.2) through the use of a 
management consultant f1rm spec1alizing in this type 01' endeavor. 
In this latter company, the management consultant team prepared 
a lesson plan format to the1r.employees. In this more impersonal 
approach was included an explanat10n of the company's compet1tive 
s1tuation and the 1ilcreas1ng needs 01' controlling and reducing 
operat1ng costs. Workers wer~ told how the plan was to work and 
how measurements were to be set up. An appeal was made that both 
the oompany and the employees would benef1t. Selected pert1nent 
2. Ib1d., p. 4. 
-
---
questions were asked and answered to stimulate further questions 
that the groups may bave.3 
It was int-ere-sting to note in 'the Pitney Bowes Company's 
installation (Plan No. J:;) that attercaretul indoctrination 
in the pilot group, additional groups actually requested incent-
ive coverage, a' a snowballing pace, until max1mum coverage waa 
achieved. People found that they could 1ncrease the1r earnings, 
without a loss of dignity. 'l'his, of course, does not mean that 
every employee chose to work harder to make more money. Some 
preferred to worltat a lesser pace for the-ir baserate.4 Instan-
ces were tound where a spec1al need .arose, and such ind1viduals 
I 
would work to atta1n the incentive pace and then settle back to 
the base rate. AtteJUpts were made, of course, to place those 
workers who wanted to be on 1ncentive in the covered areas, and 
other workers in areas whioh were not go1ng to be oovered tor 
some time, 1f at all.5 
The Pitney Bowes inoentive oovered just under th1rty per cent 
of all ottice employees at the1r home ottice and factery, repre-
sent1ng a general cross sect10n of all their otti.ce functions to .. 
include order and traft1c people, all typing work, :~;order-1'orm ~vw~ 
filing, duplicating, acoount1ng sections of various types, record 
3. Anonymous Procedures Manual. 
4. Base rate. The pay expressed in dollars per time period 
to which other-cons1derations 1n wages are added, sUQh as 1ncentiw 
premium, overtime, sh1ft bonus. The hourly rate of pay on which 
1ncentive earnings are based. Generally a guarantee. 
Ibid. p. 9. 
-
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sectlons~ advertlsing and tabul.atlng. 
The consultant~developed lncentlve plan covers every worker 
ln the organizatlon who ls not on a dlrect productlon status. The 
pecular1tles ot stud.y1ng the groups w11l be 1ncluded elsewhere 1n 
th1s chapter under the sect10n on methods ot measurement and. 
yardsticks ot product1on. 
other groups included more speclflcally, ln add1tion to the 
st.r1ctly clerlcal functlon are those of Indu8.trial Eng1neers, 
Xethods Engineers, Plant Englneers~ and the l1ke 1n tor example~ 
the American Seatlng Company of Grand Raplds, M1chlgan~ 1ncent1ve 
plan (Plan. No.3) •. , This plan ls based on budget performance, and 
\ 
1s pald to Superv1sors, loweri'management, and clerical people on 
the bas1s ot thelr control over product14m and operat1ng costs.9 
Yardst1cks 2! -..pr ...o_d;;;;.;u;;;;.;o;.,;;t;.;:1;.;;0 .. n. One ot the most d1,ttlcult pl"Oblems 
in establ1shing ind1rect 1ncent1ves 1s that ot 4eterm1nlng the 
measureme.nt ot the crews eff'orts. How many more un1ts of produc-
t10n are be1ng produced, than were produced prev1ously? In the 
tactory, tor d1rect labor~ th1s 1s easy. One merely counts the 
pleoes that are produoed or exam1ne.s equlpment productlon. charts 
or cycle counts. The people delegated to wrlte lncentlvestor 
1nd1rect occupatlons have the imaginatlon to select that tactor 
whlch most closely reflects the ef'tort at the lncentlve lndlv1d--
ual or group. In this sect10n wlll be tound a variety at meas-
urements or yardstlcks, ranglng trom p1ece work measurements to 
6. Heldgen, p. 98. 
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abatraet budget performanoe figures. Although an intormal analy~ 
must be made of several yardst1cks 1n the torm of taking various 
measurements,.stud1es or looks at historical records, a yardstick 
must f1nally be selected betore 1ntensive work can be begun in 
the measurement of the crew for incentive standards. 
The P1tney Bowes Company plan (Plan No.1) measures pert'or-
mance through the yardst1ck of number of copies made 1n the 
reproduc1ng section, quant1 ty 0'1 letters typed 0'1 a given size 
type, and other units of production which may be construed as 
little more than p1ecework type 1ncentives paying the base rate 
for performance under one hundred percent. Ttils 1ncentl va is on 
an 1ndividual basls in some departments and a groqp basis ln oth~ 
the reason tor the variation being the nature 0'1 work in some 
areas cauaing otherwise unmeasurable jobs or laok of differentia-
tion where one worker begins and another lett oft.? The Micro 
Switch Company (Plan No.4) uses a s1i'n1lar p1ecework measure in 
its clerical operations, developing flow charts to show the times 
tor each phases 0'1 an operat1on. 
Methods !! Measurement !£ Developing Standards. Whatever 
yardstlck ls selected to be the bas1s 0'1 establlsh1ng an incent-
lve, some sort of standard must be applied to the actual pro-
ductlon to determlne it it is better than what is expected or 
worse. The development of standards may take a multitude of torms 
7. Brooks, p. 12. 
1 
baaed on thetype ot yardstick that is used. 
The previously mentioned Micro Switch Oompany (Plan No.4) 
chose the use of Work~Factor Predetermined Time Values as applied 
to previously methodized operat1ons. This 1nvo1ved a two step 
approach: 
1. To get standard working cond1t10ns. 
2. Break8down analyt1ca11y the cond1t1ons and standardize them. 
The use of tb.1s type of measure means an element by element 
observance ot a task. Ult1mate1y standard data can be \&Bd which 
picks up broader categor1es encompass1ng many elements. Th1s com-
pany as a Work-Factor user 1n 1ts direct operatlons bad the facll 
11tles and trained personnel to pertorm the Work-Factor ana1ysea 
requlred to set up the measurement by th1s method. 
The management consultant (Plan No.2) 1ald out a plan 
lncorporatlng several work study techn1ques, all dlfterent trom 
the above" although "predetermined tlme values,: wh1ch are gener-
ally based on measurements of body movements wll1 be used to' 
compare results obtalned under the above three methods~9 , 
1. T1mestudy 1s the measurement ot the actual pertor-
mance ot a task by a stepwatch. Dependlng on the 
clrcumstances, tasks wl1l generally be broken down 
lnto elements and stopwatch readings tor each 
element wll1 be recorded. 
The number of c~c1es stud1ed w1l1 depend on the com-
8. Robert L. Humphrey,. trSystem Standards ana System Anal-
ys1s ~ An unpublished address to the Work-Factor Assoc1ates of the 
M1dwest, Chicago, Illlno1s (October 1959H 
9. Anonymous Procedures Manual. 
plexi~y of the task. A coavenient rule of thumb 
suggests taking studies of 58 cycles or one balf 
hour, whichever is shorter. l 
Insofar as pra.ctical, time obf!rvaticns will be made 
by continuous read1ng methods although sometimes 
observat1ons, such as .measurementl~f 1solated ele-
ments w111 be made us1ng snapback method. 
2. Work Sampling is a' techn1que for determining the 
time spent in performdng various tasks by random 
sampl1ng. Based on the law ot probab11ity,.a 
sufficient number of samples ot an activ1ty will 
provide the rat10s to the total time devoted to 
the act1vity tor a given period will in4icate ~he 
~ime spen~ 1n each ~ask. The comparison ot produc-
tion with time tor each task. as 4eveloped by Work 
Sampling, will indicate per unit time. 
3. Average actual is a me~hod tor es~ablishingunit 
times through ~he averaging ot actual production 
tor a given per10d ot time. In most cases, aver--
age actual will be determined by a s1mple arith-
metic average. However, abnormal times w111 be 
excluded trom the averaging.l3 -
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Any of the above methods yield a t1gure based on actual or 
levelled t1me.14 These tigures must be •• nverted by use ot such 
allowances as p~rsonal, fatigue, delay and incentive opportunity. 
10. Ib1d~ 
-
11. Cont1nuous reading method is a t1me study method 1n 
which the timsp1.ce runs continaously. Readings are taken at 
breaking points and the observed elemental times are obta1ned by 
subtraction. 
12. Snap back method is where the watch is returned to zero 
at the beginn1ng ot each element, reading the observed time at 
the end ot the element. 
13. Anonymous Procedures Manual. 
14. Levelled time is determ1ned by compar1~ an operator's 
performance or etfective ettort with the observer s own concept 
ot proper performance as compared to a bench mark. 
The consultant~ procedure shows the charts used in Calculat1ng 
and converting to develop standard time values, but he has 
requested that they not be included in this st)J,dy. Bas1cally" 
they are similar to any standard time study or work sampling 
averaging sheet •. 
The American SeatUlg Company plan (Plan NO.3) uses still 
another type of standard, namely that of a historical record, 
revised by a predetermined method to cover normal changes in 
operating budgets which are the standards, applying the appro-
priate required quantities, for a given cost::based on the level 
of operating activity. Only those H ••• oosts that are olearly 
beyond the control of the partic1pant--~w material price fluc-· 
tuations, taxes of all kinds, insurance, etc'~ are excluded as 
standards. IS 
Through t1me study, predeterm1ned time values and average 
typing apJt8ds P1tney Bowes (Plan No.1) developed rates for 
various cler1cal funct1ons. A sample of the composition of a 
typ1cal typ1ng standard is shown 1n Table II from the text of 
Mr. Brooks' lecture. 
18 
In analyzing this etandard data, one may observe that all of 
the elements of typ1ng a letter trom a d1ctaphone. Many of the 
elements would be similar in all d1ctaphone rates, requ1r1ng only 
a change of the var1able elements such as number of 11nes, number 
of copies, etc. Elements such as number seventeen--allowance for 
15. He1dgen, p •. lOl. 
TABLE II 
DEVELOPMENT OF A TYPIOAL TRANSORIBING RATE 
Premise: A standard type letter is dictated by B. J. 
Hotairt~ Vice-President in charge of Vice-
Presidents. The letter consists of ten 
lines of type in the body and requlres t1 ve 
carbon cop1es. The letter 1s typed by a 
g1rl in Transcribing using an electric 
typewriter with elite type. 
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Let's see how this rate would be set--
1. Oheck correspondence on job to be typed. lltd.M1!i .143 
~ Turn and open desk drawers. .026 
3. Pick out paper tor work to be typed--(6 oopies). .286 
4. Interleave oarbons (5 carbons). .455 
5. Posit1on paper in machine, straighten and position 
to type. .182 
6. Pos1tiondi~~aphone plugs in ears. .065 
7. Type data and space. .018 
8. Type ins1de address and space. .286 
9. Type salutation and space. ~065 
10. Type 10 11nes of 5t" length--Standard letter 
(.195 X 10). 1.950 
11. Type Signature, section, 1nitials, c.c." etc. .299 
12. Type dictation date. .046 
13. Remove ear plugs and aside. .065 
14. Remove typ1ng from machine. .033 
15. Remove carbons and aside. .052 
16. Attach letters to correspondenoe with clip 
and aside. .143 
17. Allowance tor erasing one error and correct-
ing (1 every 10 lines) (6 ooples). .832 
18. Change diotaphone roll (.0223 per line X 
10 11nes). .223 
--
Allowed TimeLIn mln~ 
h 
eraa1hg, were of course, based on averages of several stud1es. 
The 24% app11ed at the end of the abeve calculat10n 1s for per-
sonal, fat1gue and delay allowances. 
T1me Allowed 
TABLE III 
STANDARD ALLOWED TIMES 
TRANSCRIBING DEPARTMENT 
f' ; 
1n Mlhutes--El1te 'l'ype--Electnic ~..aah1ne 
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Ne •. of 11nes S1mp- Stan- Inter Ne •. of lines Branch No.of Techn'l. 
In Body l1t1ed dard Ott1ce In Body Memo L1nes L1ne ot 
41'" 51t H 6~" 41"" 5-tM 6j1t T~e 
-
1 1 1 3.21 3.39 3.58 1-2 1 1 3.63 1 .64 
2-3 2 2 3.71 3.89 4.08 3 2 2 4.17 2 1~2a 
4 3 
-
4.21 4.19 4.58 4-5 3-4 3 4.70 3 1.91 
5 4 3 4.71 4.89 5.08 6 5 4 5.23 4 2.55 
6 5 4 5.21 5.39 5.58 7 6 5 5.77 5 3.19 
7 6 5 5.71 5.88 6.07 8-9 7 6 6.30 6 3.83 
Thus 1t is seen that almost any of the common types of study 
, , 
'. 
.' , ... ; .. ,. 
< '. ~ • 
may blt used 1n the studylng and. establ1shment of 1ncentlves tor 
cler1cal 1nd1rect labor. All of these standards were very costly 
to develop and took a great deal of skill and imag1nat1ons, yet 
most of the" sources 1ndlcated that the 1ncent1 ves were sav1ng 
them money, as much as a thousand dollars per worker per year 
after admln1strat1ve cost, and extra earn1ngs pald oufl. 16 All of 
whlch speaks well for one company's clerlcal 1ncent1ve exper1ence. 
Methods 2! ~termln1ng Performance. Determ1n1ng employee's 
16 •. Brooks, p •. 16. 
performance must be a much eas1er process than develop1ng the 
standards~ because it 1s some&h1ng to be done perpetually if the 
incenti.ve plan endures. Bas1cally~ performanc.e 1s calculated 
by apply:ilng the standards to the un1ts of production to arr1ve 
at the earned or standard hours. These in turn~ when div1ded 
21 
by the actual hours of the 1ndiv1dual or crew yield the pertor-
mance of the 1nd1v1dual or crew. Although, the f1nal calculat10n 
is simple"many means of arriving at this calculation will be 
shown in this section. 
In the aforementioned Pitney Bowes Plan (Plan No.1) per.t'or-
mance was determ1ned by the clerical people entering their own 
units of production on the employees performance record shawn 
in F1gure 1. 
From th1s performance record, accounting people apply the 
standards to come up with the standard hours, which when div1ded 
by the actual hours will reveal the performance of the 1ndividual. 
Table m shows a typical set of standards trom an incentive pre-
rate sheet.17 On the consultant developed plan~ be1ng entirely 
on a group basiS, standards are applied Similarly, to the abov. 
plan, to 71eld standard hours, and others which do not, are shown 
1n Table IV representing a typical incent1ve group. 
Though appearing more complex, this calculation is still 
17. A prerate sheet is a form containing standards per 
Variable unit, Which when such un1ts are entered and extended,. 
w1ll reveal the total standard per major activity. 
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FIGURE 1 
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE RECORD 
PERFORMANCE RECORD 
Operat~r Sect10n 
Date 
Time Job Descript10n Unrated Rated I Standard 
j 
i 
Start1ng T1me 
\ 
Totals , 
Eff1clency % 
Form No. 2841 i g 
TABLE IV 
CALCULATION OF PERFORMANCE 
1. % Realization 
2. % of Measurable hours covered 
3. Measurable 
4. Non-measurable 
5. Supervisory and Statt 
6. Total 
7. Standard hours earned 
e. on incentive 
9. Lost time 
10. Not on incentlver: 
a. Regular jobs 
b. Special Jobs 
11. Total 
12. Non-measured 
13. SUpervisory and Staft 
14. Total hours paid 
Computation: 
Performance 
72.2% 
87.5% 
People 
8 
3 
2 
13 
Hours 
215.6 
280.Q 
20.0 
15.0 
5.0 
320.0 
120.0 
80.0 
520.0 
Line 1 = (Line 7 r Line 7 
t Line 8 (Line lOa r lOb) .,. Line 11 ) 
Une 2 - Line 8+ Line 11 
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little more than earned hours divided by actual. In this measure 
however, the performance figures do not yield the incentive pay-
ment direct. Since budgeted performance standards can not exce.d 
one hundred percent, signif1cantly, if the standards ax'e properly 
developed, a chart must be used to compute the incentive perfor-
mance based on the per cent real1zation of the budget •. Those 
hours not included as measured ax'e, of course, pa1d the base rate. 
The American. Seating Plan (Plan No.3) as a budget perfor-
mance plan, looks at the dollanrv. saved from operating at less than 
the budget. The amount of money that the crew receives is based 
on how much money is saved, with all "Middle l.u..nagement" employees 
getting a percentage of the money. No performance percentage is 
calculated as such, but a sharing of the incent1ve pool bas1s 1s 
used. Th1s pool d1str1bution will. be explained later in this 
Chppter in the section on distribution of earnings. 
Periods 2! Calculation .2! Incentive Performance. Much of the 
effectiveness of an incentive is gained by the manner in which 
payments are tendered. In the earliest days of incentives when 
piecework was in vogue" workers would present their days produc-
tion, or other reflections of the days production to the employer, 
he gave the workers so many pennies per unit, or even fraction-
al pennies per unit. Employers had the distinct advantage of 
knowing exactly what the labor costs were for a given step of the~ 
process. Workers were at the mercy of employers who may tighten 
the standard when workers became skilled or worked very hard, 
resulting in a new requirement of more pieces per hour. 
h 
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Today~ because of the complexities of products and the 
strengthening of labor unions, manufacturers are no longer able 
to tighten rates at will. Thus, management must develop incent-
ive plans more carefully in order to avoid setting loose rates. l8 
For direct labor, this is relatively easy with pre-determined 
time values and stop watoh training methods, but for indirect 
labor, many of the measures used are more subjective. Many of 
these plans involve extreme complexities in measur1ng the period 
over wb1ch earnings are oalculated. 
Perhaps the most complex period of calculat10n of incentive 
earn1ngs discussed thus far is that of the American Seat1ng 
Company plan. In th1s budget yardst1ck plan the payment 1s eased 
on a yearly basis w1th a quarterly prepayment of the yearly 
bonus. Th1s payment was done to "t1e the 1ncent1ve reasonably 
close to the groups etfort~19 
The Pitney Bowes Plan (Plan No.1) and the Consultant plan 
(Plan No.2) both pay 1ncent1ve on a weekly average of weekly 
performance, except for occupations 1n the consultant plan, 
which are su1table tor ~1ly performance caloulations. These are 
class1fied as other than jobs "restricted to employees conf1ned 
to desks and w1 th a h1gh degree of olerical Prof1cUtnC,:20 For 
18. Loose rates are those that y1eld earnings in excess of 
those warranted by the performance. 
19. He1dgen, p. 100. 
20. Anonymous Prooedures Manual. 
these latter jobs, performance is calculated on a daily bas1s, 
averaging all days under standard as be1ng one hundred per cent 
performance, Such a measure tends to ra1se performances, since 
( 
poor performance days are not recognized, but th1s method recog-
26 
n1zes days wh1ch the amount of work ava1lable 1s d1minished and 
the workers wwld not be able to produce more lf they w1shed to •. 
Close supervls10n must be supplled to assure that the workers do 
not save work to do on certaln days, thus allowing for fantast1c-
ally higher performances, wh1ch would yleld exceptional weakly 
perfomanc.es when ave~d with the poor performance days. 
Control .2! Earn1ngs~. Measures such as the above, prevent 
earnings from falling too low, when there 1s alikelihood of such 
an event. But what about earn1ngs belng too hlgh. If the h1gh 
payment ls Justified, it should be pald" but not if there is a 
phys1cal l1mit beyond wh1ch people cannot possibly work. FUrther, 
because of the method of calculat10n of perfomance and payment, 
overpayments would be made if controls were not establlshed. The 
American Seatlng Plan (Plan No.3) is the one most susceptible to 
such overpayments of any plan dlscussed thus far. 
Th1s ls so because this incentive plan has lts quarterly· 
prepayment feature and. the rules 1mpl, "The men are not, ot c()ume 
requlred to return any portlon ot •.•.•. prepaymen'" and "At the 
end of ,be year, however,. all is forglven and. the partlclpants 
all start the new year w1th a zero balance in the pool:2l OVer 
payment is avoided as much as posslble by establlshing a per c,ent 
21. • 100. 
of potent1al hours payable, based on another control of maximum 
per cent of potential hours payable, based on another control 
ot maximum per cent et hours that Iliay be pa1d.. The maximum per 
cent of hours, when mult1plied by the monthly payroll 40llars 
1nd1cates the max1mum potent1al bonus dollars that ~y be pa1d. 
The pool dollars div1ded by the potent1al bonus dollars equals 
the per cent of potent1al bonus, payable. This is cumulated 
quarterly and the employees rece1ve the potent1al bonus payable 
mult1pl1ed by the number of dollars 1n the pool. The table on22 
the next page (Table V) shows a hypothet1cal worksheet ot the pI 
The quarterly cumulative total of l1ne E represents the 
amount ot bonus pa1d out. It 1s easy to see that 1f the balance 
of the year had PQor performance, nth the no returning of pre-
paymentIUle, the employees would take home h1gher earn1ngs than 
they are el1g1ble for. If the plan were on a three month payment 
bas1s, whatever earn1ngs would be atta1ned, would rlghtrully 
belong to the employees, ~ and 1f' the company operated at a loss 
the rest of the year, the employees would rece1ve the1r base 
rate 1n much the same sort of way as the consultant da1ly bas1s 
plan, except that the calculat10n per10d 1s much greater. 
Management ga1ns an edge 1n hav1ng max1mum potent1al earn1ngs, 
allow1ng them an extra marg1n of prof1ts 1f cost performance has 
been excellent beyond the po1nt of the potent1al bonus. Once the 
potent1al bonus has been ach1eved, the ent1re proceeds of' the 
22 •. Ib1d,.p •. 99. 
-' 
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TABLE V 
HYPOTHETICAL WORKSHEET 
~O omlttegj' 
I Rerer. ~ ! 
to FTRqrp OTTIJ('l'v.R Rtr.l'! mrn OTT 4RTER 
Text Jan. ' Feb. r Mar •. Aj)r. Miy ~ 
std. Budget (all I 
Line J. It'aot. d1r. and #1000 41000 11200 $10001 #1100 i #1200 1nd1r. costs). 
L1tle E !Actual Costs 900 1050 1000 960 1000 1000 
Savings or 
L1ne a L08SXC-A-B) 100" (50) 200 50 100 200 
L1ne D 
~ount crad. to 
(25) F<frt1c. PO')l 50 100 25 50 100. n: 50 XC' 
L1ne E puJDulat1ve pool 50 25 125 150 200 300 
: 
~Ulat1ve Paten. 
Line . onus 
I 
100 200 303 406 509 612 
~ of Poten. Bonus I 
lUna G Payable(G: E f F) 50% I 121"% 41% 37% 39% 49% 
budget performance is retained by management. 
Distribution 2! Earnings. The Ameriaan Seating Incentive 
(Plan No.3) is unique in its division of the incentive pool: 
One-Balf ot the variance is credited to the incent-
ive pool (Line D)(previously illustrated) •.•• 
L!able II It is based on the assumption that 50% 
of the savings made through the cost reduction 
efforts of these men is reasonable and sufficient 
incentive for them to work towards those savings. 
Th1s,"50% of saTings~ then,. is put into a pool every 
month.. Notice linG E • •• The pool is cumulative •. 
Actual. coats in January were $10,000 under standard 
costs •. Half of the savings (#SOOO) wa.s put into the 
pool. In February, actual costs were #S,POO in excess 
of standard.' So half of the loss of $2,SOO was deduc-
ted from the ppol, making the cumulative pool for the 
first two months only #2 SOOO.. In March, savlngs 
amounted to #20,000, so #lO,POO was added to the pool •. 
It brought the cumulatlve pool to 1122500. That, then, ls 
where thelncentive money comes from. 3 
Thls pool ls thendlstributed to three groups "depending 
~pon th~ effect a man ln a glven job ma.y have on costs~24 
There.1s a 35% group--ellg1ble for 1ncentive pay up to 
a maxlmum of 35% of their base salary. This group' 
includes such men as productlon superintendents, plant 
engineer, the chlef industrlal englneer. About 10% of 
the particlpants fit lnto this group. 
There is a 2S% group prlnclpally of foremen, but includ--
ing methods engineers, office supervisors, etc. It ls 
by far the largest group"includes about 7S% of the 
partlclpa.nts. 
Finally, there is a lS% group largely of office staff 
people who have the least potential effect on costs.- 25 
The remaining lS% of the partlcipants are ln this group. 
23. ~. 
24. Ibid. 
-
2S. Ibid."p. 98. 
-
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These categor1es were based on exam1natlon ot Job descr1p--
tiona uslng objectlve cr1teria as the determlnat10n ot an 1nd1v1d-
uals etfects on costs. 
The other plans ment10ned ln thls chapter all pay elther 
the same percentage ot incent1ve earnings to all members ot 
a group 1nce,nt1 va, or the part1cular 1ndividuals incentl va earn-
lngs where he ls on an 1ndlvldual inoentive basls. 
> 
CHAPTER III 
INCENTIVES FOR INDIRECT JOBS IN THE FACTDRY 
Lev.is Included., Everyone thinks of factory workers as 
people who make t.hings. From the distance this istrue. A dis-
tant look into a factory reveals many people busl1y, phyaical1y 
engaged. Stepp1ng 1n closer one sees that they are not all mak-
1ng the product. Some are un1oad1ng raw material from a truck 
ln a recelvlng department., ot.hers are de11verlng 1t to the stock 
room. There, people are stock1ng or pu111ng mat.er1a1 trom st.ock 
to be de11vered to the noor. .'lQan may be seen mater1a1 hand--
11ng to the manufacturing floor. another may take the material 
and place 1t 1n stock trays or shelves at a worker's st.at1on. 
Perhaps, the workers mach1ne is belng repa1red, atter which a 
janitor cleans up the mess. When the product 1s made, people 
must test Gr insp~ct 1t to make sure that 1t 1s up to satisf'ac--
tory qua11ty standards. Then a mat.er1a1 handler takes it t.o be 
packed and shipped or to another stock room tor u1t1mate packing 
and shipping., 
All of the above occupat1ons have nothing to do w1th mak1ng 
or shap1ng the product" yet take them away and the tactory will 
cease to operate. Allot these operations are essent1a1 in 
I 
virtually every factory. They are the people to whomt.he least 
at.tent1on has been paid over the years. They are t.he arter1es ot 
the factory through whom t.he l1te blood ot the manufact.uring runs. 
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TEiey are the indirectt labor in the factory. Table VI detu1s the 
occupations covered in tbta chapter and the pages on wh1ch the 
var10us types of plans and occupat1ons will be covered. 
TABLE VI. 
INCENTIVE PLANS DISCUSSED IN THIS CHAPTER 
Plan No. Occupat1ons Covered (Company) PageE References" 
5. Janitor (Industr1al Eng1neer1ng Hand-- 39. 
book) ; 
6. Inspecters (ITT-Kellogg) 39, 46. 
7. Testers (ITT-Kello,gg) 39, 47, 59, 64. 
8. Material Handler & Set Up (Anonymous 40, 48, 68. 
Communications Company) 
9. Packing and Shipping (Avon Products) 37, 43, 59. 
1'0. Steel Load1ng into Barges (Anonymous 33, 35, 42, 57. 
Steel Company) 
11. Scrap Handllng (Anonymous) 33, 36, 42, 58. 
1a. Ut1llty Generat1ng(Anonymous) 37, 45, 60. 
13. Ma1ntenance (U. S. Navy, T. H.) 41, 49. 
14. Maintenance (Bay states Abras1ve) 41, 50, 61, 62, 
64, 68. 
15.· Ma1ntenance (Unlon Carb1de) 41. 
16. General Utility Crew (Anonymous) 41, 52-57, 63, 
65, 66. 
faere's a well established trend toward a high--
er ratio of indirect to direct labor. If th1s 1s 
true of manufacturing 1n general, then it's true of the 
majority of plants. That means 1t's on its way to you. 
1f' you haven't already not1oed the change 1n your plaDt •. 
Now 1f work measurement 1s to cont1nue to be a useful 
tool for the control of production and costs,. its ap-
plicat10n to ind1rect. work has to 1ncre&se.~ 
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In a recent survey by Factory magaz1ne of' se.en hundred and 
eighty-f1ve plants 1n var10us types of' manufactur1ng, the answers 
to many 1ncent1ve quest10ns were 1nd1.oated to show the quant1ty 
and nature of d1reot and 1nd1reot 1ncent1ve coverage. Table VII 
shows the percentages of employees 10 var10us oocupat10ns that 
are covered by measurements baaed only 011 plants that actually 
use labor measurement" only three hundred and two of the seven 
hundred and eighty-f1ve 1n the survey.2 
This chapter w111 show several d1fferent 1ncent1ve plans for 
the ooverage of ma1ntenance based on the exper1ences of several 
compan1es treatment of the most ind1rect of 1nd1rect groups to 
be d1scussed •. Mater1al Handling crews for more repetit1ve and 
less repet1t1ve types of' work w111 also be d1scussed.. A pack1ng 
1noent1ve and normally tho~ght of as impossible-to-measure 
1nspeotor incent1ve and a test1ng 1ncent1ve w111 also be included. 
Un1que steel 10ad1ng 1nto barges·- (Plan No. 10) and scrap handling 
(planNo. 11) w1th cranes w111 be oovered 1n this chapter. 
Assorted ut1l1ty generating stations (Plan No. 12) will also be 
Work 
~---<. 
1. Robert S •. Rice, "The Truth about wa~~nc\~~tl~eV~ <a~" 
Measurement '1'04ay: Factory, CXVII(Apr11, 1959),i,.r'7~!..l\ " 
'- U r~ . 'v C R S I TY 
, Ib1d. p. 74. 2. 
ment10ned briefly. Nearly all of the incent1ves to be covered 
are of the crew type. A discuss10n of the mer1ts of a crew 
1ncent1ve versus 1nd1vidual 1ncent1ve w1ll be 1ncluded 1n the 
section on the d1str1but1on of earn1ngs. 
TA.J31JC VI I 
PER CENT OF VARIOUS OODUPATIONS COVERED IN PLANTS THAT 
USE INCENTIVEJf 
Base: 302: 100% 
D1rect: 
Indirect: 
Mater1als Handled 
Rece1v1ng and Sh1pp1ng 
Tool and D1e Serv1ce 
Inspect10n 
Housekeeping 
Ma1ntenance 
Other: 
Cler1cal Shop 
% Of Plants That" 
Measure 
99% 
33% 
36~ 
11% 
35% 
14% 
13% 
5% 
Yarkst1cks £! Product1on.. The select10n of a. yardst1ck of 
product1on that is reflect1ve of the crews efforts is far more 
diff1cult for the indirect jobs 1n the factory, than 1t 1s for 
the direct jobs. In the ease of the direct jobs" the worker 
1s actually touching the product and it is generally far more 
repet1t1ve. W1th the 1nd1rect workers"this 1sn't necessarily 
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the case. Direot measurements are greatly preferred to indirect 
measurements since they tie the work produced more closely to 
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the 1ndividual) However" direct 1ncent1ves are not always so 
eas1ly developed for 1ndirect groups because of the unrepet1t1ve--
ness and general remoteness of the work.. Both d1rect and ind1rect 
yardst1cks will be d1scussed in th1s sect10n. 
~he f1rst yardsticks to be d1scussed are two 1ncent1ve plans 
using the d1rect type of measurement •. ~he repet1t1veBess of the 
operat10ns read1ly allowed th1s type of measure to be used. These 
plans are 1n ex1stence 1n &: large steel company whose engineer 
requested that ne1tb.er his name, nor the company's name be used. 
One of these two plans 1s an 1ncent1vecover1ng loading crews 
engaged 1n the load1ng of barges (Plan No. 10) w1th var10us sem1-
f1n1shed steel products and unloading of bulk raw mater1als:4 
Un1ts £! Production 
A. ~he standards for load1ng product to barges 
or boats are based upon the un1ts of 11fts 
of mater1al loaded accord1ng to type and s1ze 
of product and type of barge or boat. 
B. The standards for unload1ng raw materials are 
based upon the units of 100 tons of mater1al 
handled accord1ng to t'ype of material and 
lift1ng dev1ce used. 
C. The standards per parge are baaed upon the number 
of barges loaded or unloaded class1f1ed by 
type of barge cover and whether started or 
f1n1shed. 
D. The standards for turn preparat10n are based 
3. See p •. 1 •. n •. 
4. Anonymous Incent1ve Appl~cat1on standards Manual. 
-= ... 
upon the crane hOllrs worked dur1ng the pay 
per10d. 
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Thus we see number of l1fts of product"100 tons of mater1al, 
type of barge loaded, and crane hours worked as the yardst1cks or 
product10n 1n th1s plan. !he other plan based on a similar type 
of yardst1ck is for a scrap and bulk mater1al (Plan Nt>. 11) ctrew 
as well as the prov1di.ilg of general plant crane serv1ce: 
Un1ts of Product1on 
-
A. Standards for 10ad1ng or unload1ng ava1lable 
and unava1lable scrap" bulk mater1als fer 
steel add1t1ves, l1mestone and m1scellaneous 
1tems are based upon the un1ts of standard 
gauge ra1lroad cars, narrow gauge cars and 
trucks, class1f1ed by type ot mater1al, 
crane and car or truck. 
B. standards for loading or unload1ng stock 
usable 1ngots molds and stools are based 
upon the un1ts of p1eces and classified 
by type of crane,.mater1al and s1ze. 
c. standard.s for tum preparat10n are based 
upon the actual hours worked dur1ng the 
pay per1od. 
D. The standard. for genera! plant serv1ce is based 
upon the un1t of 100 1ngot tons produced in the 
Open Hearth and Electr1c FUrnaces.5 
This latter 1ncent1ve being of a more d1vers1f1ed crew 1n 
1tsact1v1t1es"has the un1que feature of comb1n1ng direct and 
1nd1rect:~·measurements 1nto the same 1ncentive plan •. The f1rst 
three measures above, a, b and c are based on work actually 
performed by the crew. The last yardstick 1s one over which the 
crew has virtually no control. The measure of 100 1ngot tons was 
5. Ib1d. 
used as a general retlection ot the level of overall plant 
activity in all production diVis1ons. A certa1n number ot 100 
ingot tons retleoted a oerta1n number of direct producing units 
operating thus yield1ng the required quantity ot this inoentive 
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crews services being needed •. This portion of the inoentive based 
on a somewhat wild yardstick acoounts for less than 10% ot the 
crews hours, thus does not weigh heavily in the determination ot 
6 t he crews performance. 
Another incentive based entirely on the direct units ot 
produotion of the indirect orew is that of the paokagingcrew at 
Avon Produc!ts (Plan No.9),. Morton· Grove" Illinois •. With the 
diversified items used,: oompJ.lcated by having to,t111 orders for 
one hundred thousand housewite salespeople,. the units of "Orders: 
"Items It and "Work1ng (trom table), tt were used as the yardst1cks ot 
production. Averages ot sizes and types of orders were used as 
the basis of standards developed by the Work-Factor predetermined 
time value system. This development will be discussed in the 
section of this ohapter covering methods ot measurement or 
developing ot standards. 
, 
A direct measurement.ot a completely different type of crew 
is used in the aforementioned steel company's electricity produc--
ins unit (Plan no. 12). 
Ibid. 
-
6. A. Helderman, "HOW to APp1l Work-Factor standards to a 
Final Assembly and Packing Function, Unpublished speech delivered 
- before the Work Factor Associates, Chicago, Illinois (May 1959), 2. 
Units 2! Production 
A. The un1ts of production for the equ1pment 
t1me valUes are the units of total gross 
MKWH generated classified by eng1ne groups. 
B •. The units of actual operat1ng hours are 
requ1red 1n c'alculat1ng equipment per-
formance •. 
c. '. The un1 ts of product1on for the work t1me 8 
valUes are the total gross ~dH generated. 
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This plan 1s d1fferent from the others previously mentioned, 
in that 1t combines equi~ent performances, developed from items 
a and. b:;.with work performanoe c to measure the crew's performance. 
Normally, equipment performanoe is only thought of 1n terms of 
direct crew appll.cat1ons, because a. machine or "equipment" usually 
indicates that a p~duct is being made •. However"in the produ~ 
tion of steel, electricity production is only indirectry related. 
Thus, we have this crew being classified as an indirect one. It 
would be correct to state that where the final product is elec-
tricityas 1n an electric company,. this crew would be considered 
as the direct crew. But as a s1delight"think of how rew di~ect 
people there would be in such an industry. All of the billing 
clerical, maintenance"meter readers and construction crews 
would be the indirect labor and would probably consitute a major 
percentage of the number of people actually employed. Similar 
direct measurements of indirect crews would exist in this steel 
company's generating of other types of utilities. 
8. Anonymous Incentive Appl1o:ation Standards Manual. 
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The Elec1;l1onic Products Department of tbe Xellogg Division 
of International Telephone and Telegrapb Corporation used direct 
measurement of tt).e number of un1ts 1nspected (Plan No.6) or 
tested (Plan No.7) as the basis for incentive pa~ents. Pre-rate 
sheets are used to 4eterm1ne the number of connect10ns inspected 
or tests performed to provide &omeasurement for these 1ndirect 
groups.9 
Industrial standards are g1ven by various cleaning mater1al 
compan1es for use in the development of directly measured 1ncent-
ive standards for janitor crews. SUcb data. is available as t1me 
required for sweep1ng (restricted), sweeping (unrestr1cted)" 
mopp1ng, restricted and. unrestricted" cleaning commodes, clean1ng 
sinks, waxing floors, buffing floors, etc-. Untortuna tely, the 
wr1ter was not able to ava11 h1mself of th1s mater1al at the t1me 
of wr1t1ng this thesis" so further d1scuss10n will not appear 
on the subject of th1s type of measure for Janitors and Cleaners. 
Standards, as mentioned above, unsubstantiated by oack up data:: 
do appear 1n the Industrial Engineerins Handbook (Plan No. 5).10 
Since there are many indirect occupations that do not read1ly 
lend themselves to d1rect measurements, 1ndirect measurements must 
be used, 1f workers are to be covered by incent1ves. One such 
application is that covering a mater1al hand11ng and set-up group 
9. Work Factor Standara ~, Kellog&-ITT. 
10. C •. W •. Funton, "Mea.surement of Storeroom~ Jan1tor"and 
Shipping and Rece1v1ng Work:. Industr1al Eng1neeri~ HaadbDOk, ed. 
H. B. Maynard (New York, 1956), p •. 3-201 • 
. ~ .. --------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
(Plan No.8) at an equipment company which w1shes to rema1n 
anonymous. In the1r 1ncent1ve, the yardst1cks of product1on 
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are "expressed 1n terms of standard hours of 1nd1rect work per 
standard (produced)~ hour of d1rect work:ll Th1s was felt ade-
quate as an 1ncent1ve yardst1ck s1nce the quant1ty of work perfor-
med by the d1rect crew causes a related quantity of work by the 
crews who supply and remelve the mater1al to be worked on. Us1ng 
standard hours, rather than actual hours elf the d1rect creW's 
CQ.uses the 1nd1rect workers to rea11zecthat 1f an operato.r 1s 
delayed by not bav1ng mater1al to work on or a backlog ~logg1ng 
their work areas" the d1rect pertormance or standard hours w1ll 
be reduced, and the yardst1ck quant1ty will be dimin1shed. 
The subject of maintenance 1s perhaps 1ndustry's greatest 
hard-to-control expenses, yet it does noth1ng toward mak1ng a 
prof1t. Noth1ng directly,. that 1s. Naturally the direct crews 
requ1rements.for properly funct10ning equipment and the tactory 
layouts are strongly felt, but. 1t:.1s the 1nd1rect crew of ma1n-
tenance that most sat1sfies thesecnee4il. Thus we have probably 
the grandest,:largest indirect c~ew ot them all, the ma1ntenanc&: 
crew. 
In the quest for control of this 1ndustrial profit eater, 
cons1derable imag~natlon has been shown 1n the development of 
measures ot performance used as the basis of 1ncentive performance. 
Yardsticks of both the d1rectand 1ndirect type of measurements 
11. Anonymous Incentive Estab11shment Gu1de. 
are used for ma1ntenance crews, rang1ng fxom deta11ed standardized 
task 11sts, having a set standard for each of several types of 
act1v1t1es (Plan No. 13),12 through counts of the number of jobs 
done (Plan No. 14),13Job est1mates (Plan No. 15),14 and finally 
the bases of standard 1nd1rect hours be1ng earned by a relat10n-
ship to standard d1rect hours as used 1n the foreg01ng material 
handler and set-up occupat10n 1ncent1ve. The yardst1ck used for 
a general ut111ty crew (Plan No.16) 1s a fantastiaally complex 
1ncent1ve based on the earned standard hours of approx1mately 
two hundred d1fferent d1rect lncent1ve arews vary1ng from 
prosperlty to;recesslonlevels ot operat1on. 
Method~ .£! Measurement ~ Development 2! standards. S1no:ec 
virtually every type of yardst1ck15 1s used 1n the area at 
1ncent1ves tor 1nd1rect labor 1n the shop" every type of 1ncent~-
1ve standard development 1s used,~1ncludlng all of those mentloned 
in the sectlon ot chapter II deallng w1th the methods of measure--
ment or developlng of standards. The manner of transcrlb1ng the 
raw data developed 1nto 1ncentiye standards for the 1ndlrect labor 
ln the f'ac,tory group w1ll be d·lscussed 1n th1s sect1on. 
12. J •. U •. Saum"" Industrlal' Engiheerlng in Ma1ntenance~~ 
Indust~lal Manasement,(February 1959), 6. . 
13. A. M •. Rob1nson, "How to Gage Ma1ntenance!outPJ1t~;,Factory! 
CXVII (February 1959), 220~ 
14. C •. Gordon Saunders, "Chart Your Way to Better Ma1nten-
ance: Factory, CXVII (December 1959), 149. 
15. A yardst1ck 1s d1fferent1ated f'rom:an method of meas-
urement 1n that a yardst1ck 1s that wh1ch 1s measured against,. 
while the method of measurement is how 1t 1s measured. 
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The f1rst standard development to be d1scussed 1s that used 
ln the aforementloned steel load1ng and scrap handllng 1ncent1ves 
(Plan Nos. 10 & 11). Timestud1es were taken, deta1l1ng the re-
qu1red times to do load1ng and unload1ng operaJ;1ons of the various 
times handled, not1ng the s1ze of the mater1al, we1ght of material, 
delays and other character1stlcs of the job 1ncludlng requlred 
crew slze, dlstances traveled to load or unload, and factors of 
fat1gue. Atter determ1n1ng average tlme for 11ke eaements of 
slmllar mater1al, and averag1ng delays from '. the stud1es as well 
as hlstorlcal delay reports, the standard formula was applled.16 
No •.. of crew ( Cycle Time)-l.OO less (Normal tlmes of crew l 
Members ( ) std. allow.O-1:embers with Rest and a 
(personal allowance 
standby T1me f Normal T1m.es • standard T1me 
Standard Tlme f Delays = Standard Tlme Value 
The standby allowance developed 1n this calculatlon 1s re-
qulred slnce a good deal of standby tlme 1s lncurred due to the 
nature of the work. These standards cover a crew of a craneman, 
swl tchman, minlmum, up to two oranement, two swl tchmen and 
four hookers, max1mum. When the hookers are used, two are located 
1n a rallroad car and two are located 1n a barge be1ng loaded, 
thus, when the crane or cranes are at the barge, the car hookers 
are 1dle and vlce versa.~7 It 1s ln th1s situat10n that the 
16. Anonymous Iricentlve Development D1rect1ve. 
17. Anonymous Incentlve App11cat1on standards Manual. 
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standby t1me would be the greatest. Capac1ty performances t'or 
the standards 1s always lower when there 1s a good deal of stand-
by s1nce standby t1me 1s 1ncluded 1n the standard caluulat10n 
at one hundred per cent. Basically, the worker cannot work 1f he 
w1shes to, nor can the company prov1de any work to do :for these 
relat1vely short spans of time. Naturally, 1f a man could work 
all o:f the t1me, he ha.s the opportun1ty to make a h1gher perfor--
mance than 1t' he were not allowed to work. Th1s pr1nc~ple 1s 
labelled as a restr1cted jOb.18 
The 1nd1rec:t measure of the scrap and. bulk mater1al crew 
was developed by tak1ng the h1stor1cal crew hours charged to 
the d1rect produc1ng fac11l1t1es over a per10d o:f time 1n the 
plant, norma11z1ng them at an arb1trary, but equ1table percentage 
and d1v1d1ng them by the one hundred 1ngot tons produced 1n the 
plant over the same t1me to der1ve the standard hours per one 
hundred 1ngot tons. Any 1mprovement over,h1stor1cal performance 
would be ent1rely cred1ted to the crew.19 
The Avon Products plan (Plan No.9) developed 1ts 1ncent1veE: 
standards through the use of Work-Factor, coupled w1 th standa.rd 
s1ze, d1stance and order s1ze averages. The elements of work 
performed by a.n operator 1n t1ll1ng an order are as t'ollows: 
18. A restr1cted job 1s one on wh1ch the work of the employ- ' 
ee 1s subject to equ1pment, process or other operat10n l1m1ts, or, 
1n wh1ch the nature of the operat1on 11m1ts the performance of 
the operator., 
19. Anonymous Incent1ve App11cat1on standards Manual. 
1 •. Picking up and unfolding the order blank. 
2. Looking t~r the f1rst.item oroened. 
3~ Picking 1tem from shelf and p1ac1ng in tray. 
4. Look1ng tor and picking the next item ordered" etc,. 
unt11 all 1tems ordered from her sect10n have been 
assembled. 
5. She will then told up and replace the order blank 
and push the trays to the next assembler and walk 
to the tront of her sect10n tor the next order. 
6. When a carton of merchand1se has been empt1ed, she 
will remove the cartorr trom the b1n and place 1t 
on the conveyor where 1t w111 be removed at the 
end ot the assembly line. 
Certain ot these elements occur only once per each 
order handled regardless ot the number of items ordered,: 
others occur once per each 1nd1v1dual 1tem ordered. We 
must therefor make. a d1stinct1on between the two, also, 
because of the length of each sectlion must vary, 1t 1s 
necessary to'cons1der walk1ng as a separate element. 
Thus we have the three major variables, order variables, 
1 tem variables, and walking. 20 
Development of standards was made by detailed Work-Factor 
analyses of the atorementioned 1tems one through s1x. For 1tem 
tour, analyses were made tor each size range of products for which 
a s1gn1f1cant t1me d1fference would be 1ncurred. These,t1mes ware 
then we1ghted, to arr1ve at the average 1tem time •. Only when a 
grand scale push of a single item~was 1n effect, was a dev1at10n 
f~m the average used. In that event, the actual analyzed t1me 
was used as the bas1s of the standard for that item, with new 
\ 
averages be1ng deve10ped. 21 
20. Helderman"p. 2. 
21. Ibid. 
-
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In the electricity generat1ng incent1ve (Plan No. 12),. stand-
ardS were developed by making rat10:~dela.y (work sampling) stud1es 
of the pertormanc.e of the crew. i'hese stud1es cons1sted of checks ,. 
made at predetermined random t1mes to reconstruct what the var10us 
power plant workers do dur1ng their day, and how much idle t1me is 
incurred. By the ratio delay or work samp11ng method, elements 
may be statist1cally checked baaed on the frequency of their 000-
urence to reveal the statist1cal level of probability. The theory 
ope.rates in the same manner. as an opinion population sample: 
Let's take a simple example to see how it works: 
Assume we want to find out how much time a. selected 
machine spends on operations, set-up, maintenanoe, and 
delay. 
Us1ng the ratio-delay technique, we visit the 
machine a predetermined number of times a day, say 10 •. 
That doesn't mean every 48 minutes during an a"hour 
day. That wouldn't be random sampling. We wantt.10 
random samplings during the day that follow no set 
pattern. We reco~ whioh element is occuring at the 
instant of each visit. At the end of 10 days the 
record may read,22 
Operation 
Set-up 
Maintenance 
Delay 
Total 
TABLE VIII 
WORK SAMPLING STUDY 
Observations 
60 
~-a 
10 
12 
-
100 
Per Cent of 
60% 
18% 
10%, 
~ 
100% 
Total 
22. Harry Lee Waddell, "Work Sampling" ,Fao:tory,CXII(Oot,1954~ 
-.. ---------------------------------------------------------------
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If this were an adequate size population to represent ooOOi-
tions~ the reader could assume that 1f cont1nuous stud1es were 
made in the area the probability of s1milar percentages of the 
elements oocur1ng would be very good. 
After the work sampl.1ng stud1es were made and. allowances 
added to each element on the bas1s of the effort 1nvolved, 
engineer1ng calculat10ns of what the equ1pment was des1gned to do 
1n the way of product1on" were analyzed. After su1table allow-
ances for outage t1me for repairs, a f1gure of 100 per oent cap-
acity was developed. Actual engine performance was determined 
for the t1me that the rat10',delay stud1es were made to determ1ne 
the requ1red crew performance at a g1ven of eng1ne efficiency. 
From the calculat10n of work hours d1v1ded by number of MKWH 
produced., ~ the standard t1me value for work performance was devel-
oped. This was done by equ1pment groups where s1gn1f1cantly 
d1fferent equipment capac1t1es were 1nvolved,<yield1ng a few stan-
dard time values to be applied depend1ng on which eng1nes would 
be opeI'IiLted. 
Equ1pment performances and capa01t1es were developed to show' 
th~ standa.rd hours per MKWH produced., Thus the bas1s is estab-
lished for calculating any future performance of the crew. 23 
The Kellogg-ITT tnspecter incent1ve plan (Plan No.6) was 
developed by the Work~Factor method" s1m1larly to the Avon plan 
mentioned pDevlously. Each element involved in inspect1ng an 
23. Anonymous Incent1ve Applicat10n standards Manual. 
electronic assembly was detail-analyzed and averages developed 
tor similar 1tems •. The elements considered included visual. 
1nspect1on of soldered connect1ons,.checks with screw ~v8rs< 
or wrenches tor t1ghtness of mechan1cal connect1ons, wri t1ng of 
reject10n or stamp1ng ot acceptance t1ckets, based on average 
faults that may be expected per unit, and other 1tems pecu11ar 
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to the operat1on. Pre-rate sheets were developed whereby every 
time a new type of unit was to be produced, all that would be 
necessary for the Industr1al Eng1neer to do, to have anew stand.--
ard., was to count the number. of soldered connvctions, mechan1cal 
connect1ons, etc. After th1s, by applying the pre-rated time per 
connect1on, he would have the standard for the new un1t~ This 
could be done from c1rcu1t d1agrams eliminat1ng any need for 
unmeasured work"untiT the standard comes out to the worker. 24 
The testor incentive (Plan No. T) was developed on the same-
basis as above, except that various meter readings, d1al adjust-
ments with knobs, switch throwing, plugs1ngs, unpluggings, re-
cordings with sim1lar pick-ups and asides were used. Add1tional 
breaks 1n the pre-rate sheets were added to allow a lesser stand-
ard where units were put aside when & defect was found that 
prohibited further testing of the unit. This cond1tion was not 
prevalent in the inspection incentive, since operation of the unit 
was not a criteria of th~job~ No incentives ha,d"been developed 
yet for trouble-shooting the sets put aside since the variety 
24. Work-Factor Standard Data Kellogg-ITT. 
~ .. ----------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
of troubles was too varied, and the quantities of a given unit 
were generally too small. Although a prescribed troubleshooting 
path could have been developed, it would have hamp~red the ope~­
ator's skills since trouble-shooting is a scienoe varying with 
the location of where the operator got his skill and tralning. 25 
Standards were developed for the material handler-and set-
up group (Plan No.8) on the bas1s20f the relationship of earned 
standard hours ot the direottcrew to requ1red hours of the indir-
ect crew., Work sampling studies were made to determine the per-
formance of the indirect crew and the number. of hours spent in 
each department. When performance was established, the required 
hours for each department ~was determined. THe standard hours 
earned by the direct c'rew was then divided 1nto then required 
hours plus allowanoes to der! ve tb.eearned standard hours of the 
indirect crew per earned standard hours, or the direct crew, or 
in short, the incentive s$andard to be applied to the particular 
department.26 
This type of standard development is fa1rly common, but it 
is_interesting to see the comment that Phil Carroll, noted incent-
;, authori ty has about this exact type of measurement of set-up men 
"This sort of incent1ve 'formula' is CODllDDnly used to pay more 
money to set-up men. But what many overlook is that often, when 
the set-up man works, the operator is idle. Then when the oper~ 
25. 
26. 
Ibid. 
-
Information der1ved from source who wishes to remain 
ator takes,'over, the set-up man is idle. Obviously, the produc-
tivity of the operator is not a measure of the set-up man's 
contribution:27 
Since in the situation studied there are about four to five 
material handlers to each set-up man, and the fact that the 
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"operator is idle~ as Mr. Carroll says, means that the operator 
can only attain one hundred per cent performance, as base rate 
less direct hours can be applied to the standard. This would be 
a major contribution toward lower performance for the indirect': 
workers. Thus, he could raise his own performance by gettlng the 
operator back to work more quickly. Bearing these facts in mind, 
there is little enough b.anIt·in using this ratio type incentive'" 
in this particular application. 
Considering the mass of yardsticks used in measurlns main-
tenance crews, standards were found developed in every imagine--
able way. One company used a ratio method and work sampling s1m-
ilar to the previously mentioned material handler set-up occupa~n 
incentive. 
The United states Nayy at Pearl Harbor (plan No. l3)iused 
what it called "Engineered. Performance standards"28 in whioh ' 
allowances for delay and fatigue were added to expert bench mark 
standards to develop s~andardsfor various types of activities. 
27. Phil Carroll, Better Wage Incentives (New York, 1957),. 
p. 90. 
28. Sawn, p. 6. 
50 
The Bay state Abrasl ve Produa:ts Company (Plan No. 14) ot' 
Westboro, Massachusetts based lts lncentlve plan on the hlstCrlClll 
tlme requlred for malntenance work.. The average t,imes used for 
Jobs were broken lnto groups of less slgnlflcant tlme dlfferences. 
From these groups the average actual tlme spent on the Jobs of 
the group was derlved. By countlng the actual number of work 
orders or Jobs;, performed ln the group, the percentage of all the 
Jobs done was derlved. This percentage multiplied by the average 
time of the group yleJ.ded the lncanti ve factor ror the group •. 
The se factors when total.led ylelded the ove~a11 standard for 
the crew •. Incentlves were based on a fifty-flfty sp11t of extra' 
work between the inc:entl ve crew and thB companYt~ lt performana 
earnlngs were over the hlstorical performance •. The fol10wlng 
lllustrations show the ac~ua~ summary data for the lncentlve 
standards: 29 (Tables IX and X) 
This lncentive ls equltab1e wlth lts fltty-tifty split ln 
that it ,recognlz.ed that pastpertormance of the crew may haYe 
been well under one hundred per cent, as it is ln most unmeasured 
operatlons. Also, a crew golng on lncentives with llmited meth-
ods descrlptlons, as exlsted here, can devlse all sorts of short 
cuts. Such short cuts are noxm&lly dlctated by management and 
most union contracts recogniz.e management's right to improve! the 
way in wh1ch the Job is'<ione. Management ls fortunate here ln 
29. Raymond H. Tolman, "Simpler Malntenance Incentlve~ 
Factory, CXVII (March 19595" 170-171. 
Per10d 
Tested 
On 
3 Months 
Average 
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TABLE IX 
HOW BASIC DATA ARE DERIVED 
Done 
.... , 
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TABLE X 
HOW RATES ARE SET UP 
Group Rate (hours) % Jobs Doner. Factor 
0-3.9 Hours 1.44 67.90 0.98 
4-7.9 Hours 5.56 13.60 .76 
8-15.9 Hours 11.00 8.60 .95 
16-31.9 Hours 22.30 4.85 1.09 
32-49.9 Hours 38.80 1.93 .75 
50-Hours and up 98.60 3.12 3.0a 
hav1ng the workers f1nd the short Ct1t~Land appl.Y1ng them.. Th1s 
sa.ves 1ndustr1al eng1neer1ng methods t1me~ Although management. 
1mprovements are made and recorded, no change 1n the rate had been 
made 1n the four, years s1nce the plan was 1nsta.l.led. Proof' of the 
degree of success 1n the plan 11es 1n the statement, IfF1rst, 1 t 
-
hasn't been too t1ght a rate because the men have cont1nuously 
made a fa1r bonus. Second, it hasn't bean too loose because work 
sampl~ng observations indicate the men st1ll have to db a fa1r 
day's work to earn bonus~30 
The f1nal plan to be 1ncluded as an 111ustrat1on of the devel-
opment of standards 1sthe stael company plan for a ut111ty 
producing d1v1s1on (Plan No. 16)~ The development of this incant--
ive describes a concept1on that requ1red nearlywo years until the 
plan reached 1nstallation. The plan encompassed the drawing-off 
and analys1s of hundreds of thousands of f1gures and 1s an 
30. Ib1d., p •. 174 •. 
-
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outstanding reflection of the usefullness and maintenance of good 
histor1cal records. The steps of development are outlined 1n 
the follow1ng manner:31 
1. From the standard. cost ut111t1es budget:was 
determ1ned the quant1ties of ut111t1es prov1ded to each 
d1rect produc1ng unit by percentage (ut111t1es furn1shed 
to ind1rect functions were either assoc1ated to the 
most closely assoc1ated d1rect produe1ng fac1lity or 
pro-rated over all d1vis1ons, reflecting the general 
level of plant operat1ons). This was done for each 
ut111ty,.whose people were to be 1ncluded 1n the plan. 
2. From the Power D1v1s1on actual hour report, 
the number of hours worked by each occupat1on 1n eaeh 
facility were obta1ned. 
3. Actual Power d1v1s1on hours were cons1dered 
1n the light of Power Dtvis10n crew schedules to deter-
m1ne wh1ch occupat.,1ons are f1xed in so far as the occu-
pation being requ1red at. certain levels of operat1on, 
and which were var1able, dim1n1sh1ng in direct propor-
tion to a p~e-establlShed cond1t1on. 
4. PowerD1v1a1on Ma1ntenance aharges, by fac111ty 
charged, .,and. outs1de ma1ntenance hours for occupations 
which also appeared 1n the maintenance crew were obta1n-
ed"mak1ng allowances for appropriat1on work. Approp-
r1at10n work was considered as spec1al jobs not normally 
fal11ng 1n the scope of work performed by the ma1ntenance 
crew •. OUts1de ma1ntenance hours were cons1dered, s1nce:'; 
these const1tuted extra hours prov1ded as ass1stance 
for the crew. 
5. Total Power D1v1s1on hours were de#eloped for 
the crew to be 1ncluded 1n the plan at the current aver ... ·· 
age, reference per10d level of general plant operat1on. 
6. Standard company allowances were appl1ed to 
the Ind1rect Actual hours after applYing the perfor-
mance factor developed from rat10 delay stud1es"to 
der1ve the Power D1vis1on requ1red hours or the ref-
31. This 1nformation', has been expla1ned 1n much deta11 
through the courtesy ot~ the Industr1al Engineer who developed 
this plan and his company.. It is their request to rema1n anony-
mous. 
erence p~r1od level of operat1on. 
1. Requ1red hours were mul t1p11ed by the perc.ent--
ages derived from the forego1ng paragraph 1, to y1eld 
the requ1red number of power d1v1s1on hours for each 
d1rect producing d1v1s10n for the reference period. 
8. For the D1rect Crew levels, the a7erage operat--
ing levels of each direct producing d1vis10n was estab-
lished, to 1nclude·· such th1ngs as number of blast fur-· 
naces operat1ng, number of furnaces in eaoh steel prod-
uc1ng facility, number of rolling mill turns (sh1tts) 
for rol11ng m111a, and operat1ng hours per pay perlod 
for conditionlng ta.ci11t1es. Mill turns (shltts) for 
non-lncent1ve groups were establlshed and related to 
100 tons of productlon at a g1ven level. Ult1mately, 
the determinant of 100 tons would be used for incent1ves 
1n such non-1ncent1ve area, at wh1ch t1me appropr1ate 
changes would be made 1n the indirect lncentive to 
reflect only the change of cond1t1ons of the direct-
crew. 
9. The crew schedules of the dlrect produclng 
fao11lt1es were. noted to prov1de the Basls of deter-
mining the direct crew hours and var10us levels 01' 
operat1on by 1ndiv1dual producing d1v1s10n. 
10. Ac,tual hours tor the direct crews were 
estab11shed trom payroll records~ 
11. The 1nde~ 01' measured performance (Incent1 vee 
performance) was estab11shed for each direct producing 
dlvis10n tor the reterence periOd. 
12. The Earned plus Unmeasured hours or the direct 
crews were estab11shed from incent1ve and payroll records. 
13. Actual hours der1ved 1n sect10n 12, above, 
ver$:'.9Qlbpared to ... the actual crew schedule hours, der1ved 
trom sect10n 9 to show the relat10nship of actual hours 
to crew schedule standard hours. 
14. By us1ng a taat or developed in 13, above, 
mul t1p11ed by the crew schedule standard hours, the 
actual hours to be expected at any level was derived. 
15. The actual hours per: level of operation 
mult1p11ed by the reference per10d 1nde~. of perfor-
mance yielded the earned plus unmeasured hours that 
may be expected at any g1 ven level ott: performance!" where 
the direct orews would be work1ng at the same effort. 
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16. The requ1red standard 1nd1rect hours deve10ped 
in paragraph 7, above"div1ded by the d1rect earned stand-
ard plUs unmeasured hours at the appropr1ate dlrect crew 
level of operat1on yielded. the 1ncent1 ve standar'Ci for 
requ1rements to a glvErldlrect produclng un1t at a given 
level of operat1on to prov1de the source of the earned 
1ndlrect standard hours. 
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The fo~lowlng 11lustratlon:w11l show a serles of sample 
standards developed., The f1gures used are purely flct1c1ous. 1n 
order to assure the anon1mlty of the source: 
Utl1ltl 
X Power 
Y Power} 
A Ga.s 
B Gas 
Water Pumplng 
4. Faclllty 
mce. Hours 
120 
80 
160. 
380 
700 
TABLE XI 
INDIRECT INCENTIVE DEVELOPMENT 
BLAST FURNACE DIVISION 
1. % of Ut1lity To 2. Total Crew 
Bl. Fce. D1v1s1on Hours Worked 3. No. F1xe4~ 
.2000 
.3300 
.4000 
.3400 
.6550 
240 
160 
160 
240. 
80 
5. Total. Cl'ew & Mtce. 
Hours P~r Fac111ty 
360 
240 
320 
620 
780 
All 
" tf 
7~ Fac~11ty Hrs to 
Blast Furnaces 
6. Assume that 1002.0 was the ma1ntenance hours requ1red 
after allowances. Speclal cons1derat1on was made of performance 
where crew hours were f1xed. 
8. 6.8 furnaces determ1ned to be reference perlod average 
operat1ng level for reference per1od, uslng 10,000 actual hours 
.... =, 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
INDIRECT INGENTlVE DEVELOPMENT 
AT 110% ~e.rformanoe (oapaoity for direot plans 120% in th1s 
divis1on). 
8. Avg. No. ot Foes. 
Per Pay Period 
9. Crew Sohedule Hours 10. Total (Calculated) , .-H-..ou,;;;;;;.,r;;.s ___ _ 
6.8 9600 10,000 
11. Average Performanoe 12. Bonus Hours 
110% 11.000 
116000 Earned Inoent. Hrs. 9161 actual hours at oapac1ty tor 
12 % capacity Performance 6.8 furnaoe level of operation 
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9167 aotua1 hrs. 6.8 Foes. = .955 faotor of actual hours as 
9600 drew SCheaGle Hrsi6.S compared to o~w Sohedu1e hours 
Furnace 
Level 
7.0 
6.0 
5.0 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 
9. Crew Sched 14.Factor. 955 X 15. Earned f Unm 
Actual. Hours Crew Sc hed. Hrs. Hrs at Ref. Pd.I.ev 
10,000 9,550 10,~5 
8,50<X~ a,l17 8;929 
7,300 6,971 7,660 
6,000 5,729 6,302 
4,500 4,~97 4,727 
3,000 2,865 3,152 
7. Indirect Crew Hours 16. Ind Crew Hrs •• -Dir 
1,002 
1,002 
1,002 
1,002 
1,002 
1,002 
E f U Hrs •• Std Time Value 
.095 
'~112 
.131 
.159 
.212 
.318 
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Methods 2! Determining Performance. A performanoe caloula-
tion formula is shown for the last mentioned incent1ve described 
1n the preceed1ng seot10r4, the ut1lity produoing division of a 
large steel company (Plan No. 16) e. 
TABLE XII 
CALCULATION OF PERFORMANCE 
Level Of Std. Time Dir Earned ,t. 
D1v1s1on QRerat10n Value X Unmeas Hours • 
Blast FUrnaoes 7~O Fces ~095 12659 
Open Hearths 18.0 Foes .112 10650 
Rolling M1il A 20 Shlfts .100 8400 
Rol11ng Mill B if Shifts .050 16000 
Aotual Hours of Indireot Work - 3600 
4034 Earned Std. Hours X 100 = 113% Performanoe 
36~O Ac£ual Hours 
Earned 
Std. Hrs. 
1201 
1193 
840 
800 
4034 
The steel loading orew performanoe (Plan No. 10) 1s calcu--
lated by determ1n1ng the quantity of the lifts that the m1ll which 
rolled the mater1al used to load the railroad car. The mill, 
be1ng on a tonnage basis incent1ve, attempts to load the steel 
1n the fewest number of (safe) lifts poss1ble. These lifts are 
then multiplied by the appropriate inoentive standard to derive""' 
the standard hours for the lifts made. Standards are similarly 
applied to bulk material unloaded on the bas1s of actual tons, 
ver1fied by cert1fied scales and invoice weight for purchased new 
material. Next, the crane hours worked are multiplied by the 
standard for crane service. Then an allowance is made for the 
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barge it8~lf~ based on the types of oovers used. All of the 
earned standard hours are added up for the incentive pay period 
and divided by the actual hours worked during the pay period to 
derive the incentive performance, Performance is calculated by 
crew shifts and by barges, which may have taken several sh1fts, 
but this is done only to determ1ne weaknesses of the operat1on. 
The scrap handling crew(Plan No. 11) is based on the applicat10n 
of the standards to Foremen's reports of the type of material 
handled and the railroad car numbers. S1nce averaged weights ar'8r; 
used for different types of cars, no we1g~ts are requested. stan-
dards are also applied to certain items actual counts, such as 
ingots, molds and stools. Turn preparation standards are applied 
to the crane actual hours used. The plant daily report of opera~ 
tions is the source of the one hundred ingot tons used as the bam 
of standard hours for general plant serv1ce. A ficticious scaled 
down, daily performance would appear as follows:( Table XlII) 
Total one hundred ingot tons 3.5 @ 2.0 standard hours per:: 
one hundred tons: 7.0 Earned Standard hours for the crew. Assume: 
crane shown is total grew for 1llustrat10n purposes. 
Total Standard hours for cars 9~6 
Total Standard hours for turn pr~I.6 
Total std. Hrs. for Plant Serv1ce 7.0 
Total Standard Hours 18.2 
Total Standard Hours - 18.2 
Total drew Hours Worked16.0: X 100=114% PertonnanCeE-' 
Crane Operator: 31-106 
S1gnalman: ;21-290 
Hrs. 
TABLE XIII 
FOREMAN'S REPORT 
Date: 
Cars Loaded 
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Tot. std. 
Mat '1 Handled ~r. ~ent S g. or Unloaded Cars Std. Hrs. 
- --
No. 1 Scrap 2 2'2 ~L)RI 6857,CB&Ql834 2 2~4 4.8 
No.4 Scrap 1t 1t U)NYC 4449 1 2.6 2.6 
Unava11ab1e Hvy 1 1 (U)PRR86104 1 2.2 2.2 
Move 2 B Frames "T.O 
to B1.Chg. 3t 3t 
8 Crane Hrs. 8Hrs. ~20 1.6 
Approved: 
~Srhrlf't~Fro~r-e-m~an~----
The Avon Products Company 1ncent1ve for packers (Plan No.9), 
the Kellogg Inspecter Incent1ve(P1an No. 6);~and the Ke11og& 
Tester (Plan No.7) all' record product1on counts of the var10us 
yardst1cks. Incentive standards shown 1n tems of pteces per: 
hour 1nstead of hours perp1ece, thus the ca1culat1on made to de-
term1ne quant1ty of payment or 1ncent1ve performance, 1s as 
follows: 
Pleces or Unlts'Produoed 
Standard Pleces Per Hour· Produaed Hours (Earned Hours) 
Payments are actually made on produced hours although an 
1ndex of performance would be developed by the standard formula: 
of produoed hours d1vided by aotual hours t1mes one hundred 
equals the 1ndex of performanoe. 
The performanoe oaloulat1on for the eleotr101ty produotng 
group would be as follows: 
TABLE XIV 
PERF.ORMANCE CALCULATION 
Assume the following oond1t1ons for a pay per1od: 
(a) Total hours of orew 40Q 
No. of Un1ts Work Perf. 
Work Performanoe Caloulat1on Pay Period Std./Un1t Total 
Aotual gross ~lH Gen. 3000 
Work Performed = ~ • 75% 
Equipment Perf. Caloulat1on 
Eng1nes 1 through 3 
2000MKWH X .150 std. Hrs./mkwh 
Eng1nes 4 through 9 
1000 NaGiH X .200 Std. Hrs./mkwh 
Total Standard Engine Hours 
Per Cent Equipment Performanoes 
~OO Total Standard Ens1ne Q2erat1ns Hours 96 Total Aotual EngIne Operat1ng Hours 
~lOO 300 
= 300 
-
200 
5m5 
X 100 • 100% 
At th1s po1nt, the work performanoe @ 75% would be oross 
referenoed to an equ1pment performanoe of 100% to y1eld the 
1noentive performanoe. 
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Similar plans to that previously mentioned also exist tor 
other divis10ns ot the utility department 1n th1s oompany.32 
Performances of the maintenance inoentives would be calculat-
ed similarly to those inoentives mentioned previously where the 
yardstioks are similar. 
From the rates previously shown i~ the development section 
of this ohapter, the Bay States Abrasive Produats Oompany (Plan 
No. 1:4) incentive caloulat1on is shown:33 
TABLE XV' 
HOW BONUS IS CALOULATED 
Step 1. Number of Jobs completed th1s week 230 
step 2. Actual hours worked by ma1ntenanoe,' group 1250 
Step 3. Oomputation of earned hours:-
Detailed way 230 X 0.98= 226 
X 0.76- 175 
X 0.95= 219 
X 1.()9c 251 
X 0.75- 173 
Total 
X 3.08- 708 1152 earned hours 
Summary Vay 230X 7.61&1750.3 
step 4. computation of Per:t!brmanc6 m.g. 140% 
1250 
step 5. Oomputation of worker's share of 1mprovemen~~ 
• 20% 
Step 6. co~utation of Bonus: 
20-!um of share of 7 12rev1ous weeks 
-% tor current 8 week 
32. Anonymous interv1ew. 
33. Talman, p~.171. 
( 
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Persons familiar with incentives may readily see that the 
methods of developing performance ot incentives for indirect labor 
is not really much different than the type of incentives tor 
indirect labor. A major concern in wr1t1ng incent1ves for 1nd1rect 
labor 1n the factory is the cost of developing and adm1n1ster1ng 
the plan. Although development has cost a considerable amount of 
money 1n many of the plans d1scussed thus far, adm1n1stration 
costs, namely, determ1n1ng performance have been very low. In 
fact, when one considers the large s1zes of some of the crews 
covered; fifty to three-hundred people and even more in some 
installat1ons, the costs~;:·of appl,tng the incentive per 1nd1v1dual 
covered are very small. 
Periods ~ Calculat10n ~ Incentl ve Performance. It may be 
seen from the 1llustrat1on for the Bay states Abrasives plan (Plan 
No. 14) that step s1x covers the use of moving averages, based on 
the previous seven weeks performance be1ng averaged into the 
wighth week's performance. This plan developed by the Simplest 
means possible encompasses as the ~asis of the yardst1ck the 
number of jobs performed. Since maintenance work may vary so 
readily from week to week, although it runs cons1stantly over the 
long haul, this type of meving average 1s used to maintain a mere 
level performance. 34 If performance were paid 1n incentive pay-
ments as it existed each week, those weeks in wh1ch the crew 
worked the hardest, performance may be the poorest since the job 
count would be the lowest 1f more than the normal number of long 
34. Ibid. 
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tedious jobs are scheduled. However, the crew, knowing that there 
will be long-jobs as well as short-jobs can look to better times 
ahead. For the initial eight payments, "you pay the first one 
as calculated - and calculate the following ones on a :running 
average of previous figures until you read an a-week accumulation, 
thereafter, you drop the earliest of 8 weeks~ 
The aforementioned steel company plan for a utility division 
(Plan No. 16) bas sim11ar plans developed. for maintenance crews. 
Although such complexities are not present as those found in the 
subject incentive, the same sort of yardstick of production is 
used. In departmental maintenance crews, as differentiated from 
general plant maintenance crews, the maintenance hours requ1red 
would dim1nish as the d1rect crew hours d1m1n1shed. Any deviat10n 
trom th1s practice was a result of a spec1al appropr1at1on to 
allocate the funds. Such act1v1t1es are excluded from the 1ncent-
1ve s1nce they are totally unrelated to any regularly planned 
program. In th1s company po11cy, 1t is spec1f1cally stated that 
up to 6 pay per1ods, twelve weeks, mov1ng averages could be used 
1n the calculat10n of performance. However due to the large 
crew s1zes and relat1vely stable level of product1on, th1s pre--
rogat1ve was not taken for any of the 1ncent1ves d1scussed in 
this thesis from that company.35 
No shop 1ncent1ves wh1ch calculate earn1ngs on a quarterly 
or annual basis for 1nd1rect labor are 1ncluded 1n th1s thesis. 
35. Ib1d. 
-
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Such incentives are known to exist in degrees in suoh organizationi 
as the Linooln Eleotric Company and Hormel.36 These, however, are 
annual bonus type plans which are not 1ncluded 1n the sense of 
incent1ve plans as used 1n this thesis. They are more-or-less a 
bonus on prof1ts as a result of better efforts of all employees 
rather than bonuses on the specifics of every day operat10ns, 
such as budgets, ,or beat1ng historical or caloulated sta.ndards. 
, 
All of the plans discussed in th1s chapter w1 th the exc,ept10n 
of the Bay State Plan (Plan No'. 14), are calculated on a one or 
two week pay period basis,: wh1chever is the normal pay period of 
the specif1c company. 
Control 2! Earn1ngs. Recognizing that many of the methods of 
determining standards involve the use of arbitrary Judgements on 
the part of the developer of the 1ncent1 ves, some companies feel 
the need of building controls 1nto the incentive plans. 
S1nce the Work-Factor plans previously discussed are based 
as much as possible on objective scient1fic determinations, no 
restr1ct10ns have been placed on the earnings of the plans. 
However, in the Kellogg plan (Plan No.7) where tested electron1c 
equ1pment is as1ded when a defect is found, a subject1ve problem 
1s avoided. Knowing that the time to find an electr1cal problem 
in a circuit can vary conSiderably, th1s company chose to have 
such work repaired on unmeasured or daywork hours~' \" Ac,tually, 1n-
36. L1ncoln also has had piecework plans for many years, but 
the extra earnings aren't nearly as great as its annual bonus. 
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cent1ve cont1nued to ex1st 1n that workers work1ng on daywork37 
are anx10us to return to measured work s1nce the max1mum earn1ngs 
on unmeasured daywork ar&the base rate. Ne1ther penalty nor 
reward 1s given for slowness or speed for such aetiv1t1es. 
An add1t10nal factor 1s app11ed as a control on the steel 
com','any ut111ty div1s1on plan (Plan No. 16). This control comes 
1n the form of a standard wh1ch when app11ed y1elds the minimum 
actual hours that may be used 1n the performance calcUlation. 
Th1s f1gure or the actual hours 1s used as the 6enom1nator 1n the 
performance calculat1on, wh1chever, 1s greater. The use of the 
m1n1mum actual hours that may be used rather than the actual hours 
result in a performance 1n the area of one hundred twenty per 
cent depending on the performance of the direct determ1nant crew 
1n relat10n to the1r expected capaCity performances. This max-
1mum performance 1s des1reable for two reasons. 
1. S1nce d1rect crews can not achieve the1r cap-
ac1ty performances without oonsiderable effort, it 
poss1ble at all, due to equ1pment capac1 ties, wage inequi--· 
ties are prevented by not allow1ng the 1nd1rect crews 
wages to soar ahead of the more critical Jobs of the 
comparable direct crew cl~ssifications. 
imum 
show 
ated 
2. Serv1ce may suffer w1th less than the max--
actual hours be1ng used, although this may not 
up for year~ to come 1n excess1vely deterior-
equ1pment.38 
In the case of this ind1rect crew, management has the absol-
37. Daywork is wo~ performed which is paid on the basis of 
a rate per un1t of time worked regardless of production. 
38. Anonymous Procedure Manual. 
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ute discretion of maintaining the number of employees in the 
indirect orew. To prevent any 1nequity to the ind1reot orew, 
management must exercise d1l1gent effort to maintain the ind1reot 
orew hours s11ghtly above the m1n1mum indireot orew hours allowed. 
An 1llustrat1on of the caloulat1on of the m1n1mum aotual 
hours allowed standard development follows: 
TABLE XVI 
CALCULATION OF MINIMUM ACTUAL HOURS ALLOWED 
Appropriate Standard 
T1me Value (.095) 
• 120% Maximum 
1ntended perfor-
manoe 
-
-
X D1reot Earned Hours 
at Capaoity Perfor-
manoe 12606 
= Earned Ind1reot 
Standard Hours @ 
Capaoi ty Perfor--
manoe 1198 
Aotual Indireot Hours .Aotual Direot H~ 
at Capaoity Perfor- @ Capaoity 10505 
manoe 998 
= The Standard T1me Value for Min1mum 
Aotual Hours Allowed .095 
This f1gure divided by the standard time value for the same 
level of operation yielded a faotor whioh when applied to other 
standard time values in the previous example, yielded the soaled 
down standard time values for maximum aotual hours allowed s.t 
various levels. In the above illustration, the standard time 
value and the standal~ time value for minimum aotual hours allowed 
are equal s1noe one hundred twenty per oent is the oapacity 
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performance for the direct plan as well as the indirect plan. A 
check formula used to verify the minimum ac~ual allowed standards 
could have been used in development of the minimum actual 
allowed standards could have been used in development of the 
minimum actual allowed standards but was not, due to fractional 
deviations which might change incentive performance. The 
formula follows: 
standard Time Value 
Minimum Actual Standard x 
Index of Performance 
of the Direct Crew at 
Capacity 
Capacity 
: 120% 
Perform. 
This formula if used for development of standards for mini-
mum actual allowed hours would appear as follows: 
.095 X 120% • 120% x 
.092(12O l 
= 
120 
x 
11.4 
= 
120 
-x 
X 
-
.095 Standard Time Value for 
- Minimum Actual Hours Allowed 
In use, the standard time value for minimum~actual hours 
would be applied to the actual hours of the appropriated direct 
crew just as the standard time values are applied to the earned 
hours of the appropriate direct crew. After being totalled from 
all direct determinant units, these hours would be used in the 
.., 
per1"ormanOB a:a1Clllatlon lf greater than the ao:ttlal hours worked 
by the lndirect crew. 39 
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A degree of control can be said to exist ln the Bay State 
Plan (Plan No. 14) 'with lts flfty-tl:tty split of earnings over su 
dard. If the employeee run away w1th per.formance they wl1l brlng 
savlng~ to the company right along w1th themselves, since when 
an extra-dollar is made by the employees, an extra dollar is made 
by the company. 40 
An lnterest1ng oontrol to raise earnings was discovered in 
one of the aforementloned plans. Since direot workers oan produce 
as much as they wish when unhampered by machine cycle tlmes or 
raw materlal shortages, or slow feeds, there ls no restrlctlon on 
the amount of lncenti ve that they may earn, wl th1n thelr elm human 
endurance. Such ls not generally the advantage of lndlrect.~ 
workers. 1'he savlngs on lnoentive depends on how few hours are' 
used to do the work that ls available. Thus a reduo·tlon of orew 
becomes mandatory to the sucoess of many of these·,lndlrect lnoent-
lve appllcatlons. The company whlch established the prevlously 
dlscussed material handler and set-up incentive (Plan No.8) sought 
to make lt an immediate success without any drastl0 reductlons in 
crew size, further it was Wisely belleved that workers oanno~ 
suddenly improve their werk effort to any appreolable extent. 
Such lmprovement only comes as a result of gradual oonditlonlng •. 
39. Anonymous lntervlew. 
40. Talman, p. 974 • 
Thus, ac:handicap was given to the crew to encourage them in bring-
ing their performa.nce up gradually. After studying oompany tum--
over records and discussing previous standard performance atta1n-
ment times, a, handicap was set up based on allowing that halt ot 
the distance 1n pertormanc'8 p'oints between 87 and 114% to be 
added on the arew's actual performance aDd used as the actual 
basis of payment ot incentive. This well served its purpose ot 
allowing normal attr1tion to take its toll and a normally progres-
sive training period to accustom remaining workers to the new 
pace. Charted, this handicap appears 1n Table ~~ 
It ean be seen that when the crew attains eighty-seven per 
cent performance on their own,. they beg1n earning inc'entive with 
the handioap. Of course, when the;. one hundred fourteen pel'_ cent 
handicap limit is attalned~ there is no further handioap, and thet 
orew stands on its own. 
This hand1cap was permitted for a six-month period after 
installation of the plan.4l Other controls of earnings which could 
appropriately be applied to incentive or indirect labor as well 
as d1rect labor are the pay plans found in various books showing 
the history of 1ncent1ves. Gantt"Taylor, Bedaux, Rowan, Emerson 
and Halsey all have prescr1bed formulae to be used 1n the ca.lou-· 
lation ot 1ttcentives. These incentive formulae generally tollow 
a pattern to protect the company from loose rates, or provide a 
little extra stimulus to get the worker on to a higher production 
4l~ Anonymous Incentive Application standards Manual. 
~ .. ~ ........ --------------------------------------------------------~ 
TABLE XVII 
INCENTIVE HANDICAP 
Actual Performance 
86% and under 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100.· 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
ID9 
110 
111 
112 
11;5 
114 
Perf'ormanc:e ~ Handlcap 
100% (Base Rate) 
101 
101 
102 
102 
103 
103 
104 
104 
105 
105 
106 
105 
10'7 
107 
108 
108 
109 
109 
110 
110 
111 
111 
112 
112 
113 
113 
114 
114 
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paae •. These f'ormrulae will not be discussed further sih0'8 their use 
and detall may be found in any number of places.42 By and lal"-8" 
the plans in existence in the area of' this thesis, other than those 
the writer has described as personalized (to the individual 
applications) splits of' earnings, are paid on a one per cent incen-
tive f'or each one per cent of perf'ormance over the standard rate. 
!pertormance of' one hundred per cent or under is paid the base rate. 
Distribution of' Incentive Earnings. In all of' these plans:., 
members of' the crew type incentives have participated in earnings 
at the same percentage added to their earnings, maintaining the 
higher ratio of pay for higher rated Jobs. Individuals on nun--
crew type incentives all receive earnings based on the1r incentive· 
performance. Normally, incentive earnings are paid in the week 
f'ollowing the week in which the work 1a,::perf'ormed, however, there 
may be a greater lapse of' t1me if inadequate time is available in 
this per-iod to compile the data, required to c'alcuJ.ate the earnings. 
An interesting feature in the foregoing uti11ty plan (Plan No. 
16) 1n the distr1bution of' its earnings, is a feedback of earned 
hours that come in to the performance calculation f'rom another 
plan. This plan, covering general plant serv1ce contains the bulk 
of the ma1ntenance crew hours. Another port10n of the maintenance 
hours are used 1n a utility plan wh1ch prov1des serv1ce to those 
uti11ties which are on d1rect type measurements. This smaller 
42. M1chael J. Jucius, Personnel Management, (Homewood, Ill., 
P.955), p., 376. 
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group's earn1ngs are based on rat10s to the1r d1rect p;-oducing 
groups 1n the ut1l1ty division. Specifying certa1n members of the 
unif1ed maintenance crew to certa1n areas would impract1cal, and 
management had the performance of this <trew calculated separately. 
Other members of th1s departmental crew earned at the performance 
of the depa~mental plan, whlle the malntenance hours, both earn--
ed and actual were carried lnto the seneral serv1ce plan to be 
lncluded ln its performance calculatlon. Thus, these ma1ntenance 
people's performance was pald on the basls of the overall average, 
rather than thelr plans average. 
Th1s payment was considered just, because the lndlvldual wor-
kers efforts are performed as a part of either crew, even durlng 
the same pay perlod. 
Much has been sald about the benefits of crew incentlves over 
indlvldual lncentlves, or vice versa •. Harold R •. Nlssley, a con--
, 
sultlng Englneer recently presented arguments on the subject of 
indlvidual lncentlves versus group lncentlves. Selected advanta-·, 
ges of group lncenti ves whlc h are generally more sul table for 
measuringrlndlrect are presented as follows: 
LIndlvidua!7measurement ls time-consuming and freq-
uently costly unless a ~anagement wlshes to take some 
blg ohances<wlth hlstorical or -hunch" work standards. 
Moreover a spirlt of cooperation 1s lacklng in many 
individual incentive plans. 
Because much time 1s frequently spent in resolv--
lng operator time-study grievances, such operator 
grlevances are usually reduced when a group incentive 
plan is substituted for an ind1vidual incentive plan. 
Moreover, under a group incentive plan there develops 
(theoretically, at least) ~ group esprit de ~ 
that gets out production with a minimum amo~ fuss 
and fricti~~, everyone pitches in regardless of whose job it is. 
The article goes on to tell how absences of a member of a 
group are less of a problem when other workers can fill the gap 
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to maintain their earnings. The extra costs of installing individ 
ual incentives are presented in favor of group incentives. 
The disadvantages of the group plan is that individual effort 
may be too diluted to yield the best efforts, standards may be 
too loosely developed and the group incentives require more exper-
ience by the company, union, and the industry if they are to be 
successful. 
The arguments presented weigh heavier in favor of group 
incentives bearing in mind that the measurement of the workers 
should be as closely controlled by the worker included, as is 
poss1ble. A total plant incentive leaves the workers with the 
feeling that what they may do as individuals 1sn't going to hurt 
or help:.:the plan noticeably •. Thus, if all workers felt this way 
the plan would yield poor performances, and the adv~tages of 
having an incentive would diminish. 
., 
CHAPTER IV 
INCENTIVES FOR MANAGEMENT 
Levels Included. "Hey, boss'. You want me to cash your check11 
This remark was passed after an empIoyee had observed his foreman 
waiting in line to cash his pay check"and arose from the worker's 
overtime and incentive making his take-home pay higher than that 
of his foreman. 
Nothing can be so demoralizing to the top levels in a plant 
as having subordinates making more than their supervisors. Many 
companies avoid this situation by giving supervisors and other 
management raises as they are given to the hourly workers. 
Other companies feel that such practices make it appear as 
1f the union's bargaining is pushing management wages upward •. 
Many of these companies have chosen management incentives as a 
way to give extra rewards to management for jobs well done. 
I 
The New Britain ~~chine Company (Plan No. l7)'of New Brita1n, 
Cormecticut, has a supervisory incentive covering "Supervisors and 
Assistant SUpervisors of the Major Manufacturing and Assembly 
Departments:2 This plan was installed to make supervisors a part 
1. Roger M. Bellows, PsychGllogy E!. Persormel !!!. Business ~ 
Industry, (New York, 1949), p •. 219. 
2. McCarthy,:p. 104. 
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of ~he "management team~ raise superv1sors earnings, reduce 
supert1sor turnover" ORB make superv1sors more aware of costs. 
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The prev10usly mentioned Amer1can Seat1ng Plan (Plan No.3) 
covers all of its "Middle management~ defined as everyone on the 
exempt payroll (salaried personnel who are not el1gible for 
compulsory overtime under Federal Regulat1ons). Company off1cers 
and sen10r execut1ves, people charged w1th the adm1n1strat1on of 
the plan, and salesman who work on comm1ss1on are not 1ncluded.3 
Another company wh1ch has requested that 1t rema1n anonymous 
has a management 1ncentive Qover1ng hundreds of management employ-
ees to 1nclude account1ng people, 1ndustr1al eng1neer1ng people 
and all foremen, superv1sors, and eng1neers who are cons1dered 
management. The top levels of every department superv1sors and 
non- superv1sors who are categorized as tlManagement~ participate 
in the 1nc'ent1 ve. 4. 
stock opt1ons are a method 1n wh1ch 1ncentives g1ven top 
executives to encourage better efforts in their work" since as theJ 
themselves become owners of the bus1ness, they stand to prof1t as 
the company prof1 ts.5 
The Un1ted states Stieel Corporat1on (Plan No •. 18) has an 
employee stock plan for all salar1ed employees who are not eligible 
3. He1dgen" p •. 98. 
4. AnonymQus Interv1ew. 
5. Michael J. Juo1us, Personnel Management~,(Homewood, Ill., 
1955), p. 387. 
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INCENTIVE PLANS DISCUSSED'-IN THIS CHAPTER 
Plan No. Occupation (Company) Page Referencee 
17. Supervisory (New Br1ta1n Machine)' 74, 77, 79, 84 
85, 87, 88. 
18. Salar1ed Employees (U. s. Steel) 75. 
19. Management (Anonymous ) ~ 75, 81, 88. 
20. Foremen (Gantt) 82, 84. 
i 
l 
.... 
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tor union membership. This plan covers ottice workerBj middle 
management, supervisors and other wide ranges of non-union job 
classifications. While not an incentive plan yielding specific 
rewards for specific~meritorious deeds, it is an incentive much 
in the same manner that the top executives stock options are an 
incentive. Although, a plan covering tens ot thousands of employ-
ees as this plan does, cannot be expected to have a very strong 
impact on the individual. Its major merit lies in its p.rovisions 
which encourage long job tenure. Th1s will be discussed later in 
this chapter in the section covering the distribution ot incentive 
earnings. 6 
Yardsticks .2! Production. In order;: to provide an orderly 
incentive measurement that would give a reasonab~e measure of 
performance and still mainta1n the, prestige of the 1nd1vidual, 
incentives vastly different trom these used tor indirect jobs in 
the factory had to be developed for positions of management. 
The New Britain Machine Company plan (Plan No. 17) selected 
a,multitude of factors to serve as the yardstick for their super-
visory team. The seven factors cons1dered are presented below, 
1. Deaartmental Activity Factor is expressed in terms 
of pro uet!on hours. The standard base, at which bonus 
starts, is approximately 50% of normal volume. Normal 
volume ot productive hours 1s 80% of one sh1ft c-apacity. 
SUpervisors are not penalized for volumes under the 
standard base •. 
6. U •. S. steel Corporation --Employee Sav1ngs Plan. A 
pampnlet explaining the employee savings plan, approvea-by the 
Board of D1rectors and stockholders for 1nstallation ~~y 1, 1957. 
2. Non-produc:tive Labor Factor covers assistand fore--
men, aepartment clerks, sweepers, material handlers, and 
others employed wi thin the department or temp9ra,rily 
borrowed from other sections. The standard number 
o~ hours at any volume of activity is the sum of a fixed 
minimum plus an amount that varies directly with the 
volume • e. e. 
3~ Si:oap Factor is based on the manufacturing cost of 
depar mental scrap to and including the operation at 
which an 1 tem is scrapped. 
4. Reclaim Factor is based on the cost of recla1ming 
or reworking salvageable damaged products for which the 
department is responsible. 
5. Suppl1e. and Small Tool Faator 1s based on the 
value of such-rtems acquired by a direct purchase or 
1nternal requisit10n 0 ••. 
6. Service Faotor is based on the hours oharged to a 
department from internal or external souroes for: lost 
t1me (siok, 1njured, or absent); maintenanoe and repair 
of maohinery, equipment faoilities, tools, dies, and 
fixtures... 
7.. Pam-ormanoa Factor is based on the ratio of Prod"fC-
tion emplqyees' aotual hours to standard hours ••• 
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Another company,. wh1ch has chosen to remain anonymous, has a 
management incentive plan based on performance against rigidly 
defined standard costs and budget. As a second effect, the plan 
includes additional rewards for management tightening its budget 
standards •. Th1s tightening serves to reduce budgets, making the 
continued attainment of incentive on budget performance more dif-
ficult and th1s pays handsome rewards for such tighteningse 
An incentive based on the performance of the supervisor's people 
is suggested by Robert Rice, the Industrial Production Ed1tor of 
Factory Magazine~ Th1s yardstick may have a tendency to bring the 
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superv1sor closer to the level of his workers, ~ a thought which is. 
not relished by some managements:.. Other yardsticks may be "an 
index of employee unrest in a department, miscellaneous records of 
a quant1tative sort are somet1mes applicable ••.•. and subject1ve 
judgements 1nclud1ng att1tude scales and rat1ng devices may be 
used by higher management~9 The yardstick of general company 
prosper1ty is the measure used in the stock opt10n plans or the 
U. S. Steel Emplo~ee Sav1ngs Plan., 
Methods 2! measurement ~ Developing Standards. Obviously, 
the management jobs are so d1versified that you would not be able 
to study them with a stopwatch. Work sampling or other time study 
methods would take away the dignity of' management. Besides, 
management at its very best, when the job 1s well under control, 
may be sitt1ng with their feet propped up on a desk. Thus, ~he 
measurement of management's performance must be established thrau 
accomp11shments in the past rather than direct observat10n. Some 
" 
of' the accomplishments that serve as the basis of measurement 
standards will be discussed in this section. 
The previously mentioned American Seating Company (Plan No.3) 
I 
and the New Br1tain Machine Company Plans (Plan No17)'both base 
their supervisory incentives on "past records and current c'Dndi-
tions:10 In developing standa~s, New Britain had to study the 
data and appl~ logic to determine the best way to measure each 
9. Bellows, p. 220. 
10 •. McCarthy" p. 102 •. 
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factor. Fac~or weighting--how much of the total potential bonus 
should be apportioned to each factor--was deter~ined the same 
way, by study ot the facts~ll cost savings played a big part in 
the development of standards. Ratio.s were established to deter--
mine which factors were important and to what degree. The various 
factors where foremen had control were analyzed on the basis of 
what has been normal performance •. The degree of possible improve-
ment was calculated and a chart established to show the amount of 
cost reduction that would bring a given amount of dollars to the 
foreman. The following formula will show how this dollar reward 
was established: 
Assigned percentages X Normal cost = % Reward to Foremen 
I Savings 
Ratio Established • % Reward to Foremen 
% Reward to Foremen X Ratio of Pay • # Reward to Fore. 
Although this plan involves arbitrary judgements after the 
normal is established, its equitabl1ity can be determined by the 
fact that the dollar savings to the company is a by-product of the 
performance calculation. Such being the case, it is obvious to 
the supervisors how much of a share of the savings on a given cost 
item goes to them •. Management in turn dare not be unfair when 
such unfatrness would be so very obvious~ 
11. ~., p •. l05. 
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The standards ,for another plan (Plan No •. 19)12 covering all 
occupations~of management were formulated arbitrarily and based 
on h1storica1 performance. Executive ~mnagement decided that 
ninety-seven per cent cost performance was "par for the course~ 
and said that would be 100% incentive performance for budget 
performance. For each additional one percent of cost performance, 
management received five,. per cent more incentive up to a maximum 
of twenty five per cent ince~tive for cost performance up to 102%. 
Another facet of the plan allows incentive earnings for tightening 
those very standards that yield the incentive earnings. The pro-
portion selected for this facet is 10% of a years pay to manage--
ment for each one per cent of t1ghtening of the plant's budget. 
The questiona one may ask here are, "What does one per cent of 
budget performance mean in terms of dollars saved and how much 
would five per cent of the total management payroll amount to'-
If these figures are two to one, respect1ve1y, the management 
group would be sharing savings ,fifty-fifty with the company. 
The company keeps all savings earned When budget per.formanae 
is over the 102% mark. This is where the tightening comes in. IF 
102% performance can be maintained, area managers should tighten 
their budget standards and cash in on the "big ki11~, budget improv-
ement award.. Of course, if standards;:· are tightened too much, 
management loses on its budget performance incentive. The quest1o~ 
12. The source of this plan has requested that it remain 
anonymous •. Also, it has chosen not to indicate those particulars 
that weuld indicate how equitable the plan is. 
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asked to determ1ne equ1tab111ty 1n th1s factor are, "How much 1s 
one per cent of the plant budget as compared to ten per cent of 
the annual management payroll tt'r Th1s latter factor has a speed--
up effect 1n that once the standards have t1ghtened, they w111 be 
t1ght from then on, although the reward" however handsome,. 1s only 
g1ven once. 
Although this plan w111 tend to level out at a constant 
performanee, it will perpetually keep management on 1ts toes and 
the object1ves of controlling costs will continue to be achieved. 
Other management 1ncentive plans which measured the foremen 
alone, are some of the older plans (Plan No. 20): 
Perhaps the oldest form of compensat1ng supervisors 
and foremen upon a basis ot.her than straight salary 1s that 
of paJ1ng them a bonus, depending upon the incent1ve earn-
ings of the1r subord1nates. For example, under the Gantt 
Plan (one ot the early plans)" prov1sion was originally 
made for paying superv1sors a bonus wh1ch increased as 
the number of subord1nates who earned a bonus 1noreased. 
And under some adoptions of the Halsey Plan, the super-
visor shared 1n part of the t1me saved by his subordinates. 
Thus the employee rece1ved 66-2/3 per cent of the time 
saved, and the superv1sor, an ind1rect worker in the 
department, rece1ved the remain1ng 33-1/3 peri cent. In 
some 1nstallat10ns of the Bedaux Plan, the superv1sor 
receives 25 per cent of the B's saved •.•. e. l~ 
The "objective and quantitative" measure of per£"ormance ot a 
foreman's workers may eas1ly be estab11shed from pay records or 
counts of pieces. Rejects, scrap or wasted material may be (a-) 
ODmpared to the 1nde~:for last month or last year to see whether 
the department was up to 1ts previous record or (b) compared to 
aE set standard estab11shed by an effic1ency spec1alist e ••.•• "14 
12. Juclus, p. 389. 
13. Bellows. P. 221. 
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B!.s1aa11y,.1t may be said that the method of determ1n1ng the 
standards for the management 1s a subjective and arbitrary meas-
ure. Were management to affect the "shape or form of the produc:t~ 
measures as objective as those for direct labor employees, could 
be used. 
Methods 2! Determining Pertormance. Performance is oa1culat-
ed as in all prev1ous1y ment10ned plans, by the dividing of the 
standard unit of measure by the actual unit of measure or just 
assigning a given number of dollars, or a perfonmance from some-
one else's (the direct crews) earnings. 
In the previously mentioned anon~ous plan (Plan No. 19) for 
all members of management"the budgets are based on standard cost 
and they reflect var10us levels of operating ~onditions. For 
instance, 1f production is cut in half, a plant manager is still 
allowed, industrial engineering may have to reduce forces 10%, 
some general foremen may be "bumped" down, other pre-established 
quantities of foremen may be eliminated, direct labor Will, of 
course, be cut approximately in half, uti11ties will diminish by 
one-third, raw material requirements will be cut in halt, etc. If 
allot these conditions are mat to the letter, management has met 
its budget to the letter and the calculation of standard (budget) 
p~rformance over actual performance equals 100%. Under the rules 
this one hundred per cent would yield fitteenper cent incentive. 
On the other factor of this plan, savings on budget tightenings are 
ivided by the appropriate plant budget figure to reveal the per 
cent ot effect. This f1gure when multiplied by ten would reveal 
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the per cent of effect. This figure when multiplied by ten would 
reveal the performance to be pa1d on th1s factor. 15 
The New Britain Machine Company plan (Plan No •. 17) is app11ed 
as follows: 
The rates of rewards :and penalt1es for each factor 
were summar1zed, by departments, on "Normals and Formulas" 
forms--one for each department •.••. 
At the end of each 4-week per10d the Accountin~ 
Department prepares a "Supervisors Incent1ve Report, ••• -
It is calculated by apply1ng the rates on the normals and 
formulas sheets to current actual performance and cost 
data for each department. 
Oontrol effect1veness is found by dividing the actual 
quant1t1es by normal--l00% is normal performance; under 
100% is better than normal, and more than 100% is sub--· 
standard. 
Pluses and minuses are added. The d1fferenrg is the 
net percentage benus--percentage of base salary. 
Tables XIX and XX show how the perfonmance is actually 
calculated. 
An incentive based on "a combined index of the efficiency of 
who are under the foremarf!l.7 would give the foreman the same over-
all performance as his workers. Of course, the Gantt version 
(Plan No. 20) previously mentioned increases earnings as the num-
ber of workers under the foreman increases. The Gantt arrangement 
has merit in that a supervtsor will exerc~se(more supel'8'ision when 
he superv1ses more people. Oonsideration'must, of course, be 
given to the nature of the work. A company turning out the exact 
15. Anonymous interview' •. 
1~·· ~lCr;';~Y'n P·2J-g5. 
TABLE XIX 
NORMALS AND FORMULAS FORM 
Rewards and Pena1t1es 
-
~£!~ Reward. ~.2!~ RewaI'd %ot !2!!! Rewam 
Factor 
Non-Prod 
Hours 
Non-Prod 
Hours 
Recla1m 
Supp11es 
Serv1ce 
Hours 
55% 0% 87% 
60% 1 91% 
64% 2 96% 
69% 3 100% 
73% 4 105% 
78% 5 110% 
82% 6 116% 
Normal 
5075 times the direct 
ours tor the per10d 
plus 100 hours. 
-
• 0049 times the direct 
nours tor the period. 
• 0027 times the average 
direct hours tor the 
period. 
!~5 times the average 
rect hours tor the 
last 3 periods, plus 
130. 
fi015 t1mes the d1rect 
ours tor the per10d 
p~us 26 hours. 
-
7~ 123% 14% 
8 130% 15 
9 139% 16 
10 149% 17 
11 161% 1~8 
12 177% 19 
13 218% 20 
Rewards and Penalties 
D1v1de the actual non-produc.t1ve 
hours by the normal non-produc--
t1ve hours and for each4~ below 
or above 100% add or deauct 1% 
of salary • 
D1v1de the actual scrap cost 
tor the period by the normal 
scrap cost, and tor each ~ 
below or above 100% add or 
deduct 1% of bonus • 
D1v1de the actual rec:ia1m cost, 
tor the per10d by the normal, 
and for each 70% below or above 
100% add or deduct 1% of bonus. 
D1v1de the average cost of sup-
p11es tor the last three per10ds 
by the normal, and tor each 6~ 
below or above 100% add or deduct 1% ot bonus. 
D1v1de the actual serv1ce hours 
tor the per10d by the normal, and 
for eaoh 82% below or above 100% 
add or de uet 1% of bonus. 
" 
Factor Normal 
Pert'or- 100% 
rABLE XIX (Continued) 
NORMALS AND FORMULAS FORM 
Rewards and Penalties 
The per cent or reward or 
86 
manes penalty is determined by direct 
Ratio reading on the following table: 
Pert'or- Perf or- Perfor- Perfor-
mance mance mance mance 
RatiO Reward Ratio Reward Ratio Penalty Ratio Penaltl 
90% 1% 65% 5% 110% 1% 135% 5% 80 2 60 6 120 2 140 6 
75 3 55 7 125 3 150 7 
70 4 130 4 
same produot, , year after year, having high 1ndividual worker 
specia11zat1on requires less supervis10n per foreman, than a 
company hav1ng a job shop operation where worker's chores change 
almost da11y. 
Per10ds 2! Calculation 2! Incent1ve Earnings. By and large 
the more desireable, several-factor management 1ncentives are 
calculated over a longer period of time than are plans for other 
groups discussed. It is obvious that management must look at the 
good and the bad, the "big picture~ Nearly every industry has 
fluctuations during the year due to seasonal buying and selling 
trends. Although these changes seldom effeat the lower echelon 
workers, except through unemployment which then ceases to be a, 
manufacturing problem, they do cause fluctuat10n in the profits 
from period to period. ~~nagement should be rewarded for its 
SuperVl1.sor 
Activit;£ 
1. Produc.-
tive hrs. 
2. Non-prod-
TABLE'XX 
SUPERVISOR'S INOENTIVE REPORT 
John Doe Bemod 
Normal Actual ~ 
12,000 15,960.0 133.0%, 
1,190 1,215.0 102.1 
uct1ve hrs. 
3 .. ~6crap #78 #63 80.8 
4. Recla1ms $43 $21 48.8 
5 .. SUpp11es #918 11,091.06 119.0 (3 Month 
Average) , 
6. Serv1ce 237 121.3 51.3 (3 Month 
Average) 
7. Perfor- 100%, 75.5 75.5% 
mance 
Ratio 
Total 
Net percentage 
Dollars 
June 
t.- -
15.~0% 
.60%, 
.38%, 
.13%, 
3.17% 
4.06% 
2.90%, 
23.37% 
19.60%' 
3.17%, 
$98 •. 
'ettonts to adjust expenses When such adJustmtftlts are called for. 
To only economize in good t1mes could be a disastrous mistake. 
The previously mentioned New Brita1n plan (Plan No. 17) calc-
~ates performance on a monthly bas1s. With the type of 1tems 
considered and the weight1ng of the 1tems, th1s 1s an acee~tabie-
period of time. But for the aforementioned anonymous incentive 
plan for management, the w1de range of total budget consideratiDn~ 
including less controllablLe items warrant a longer:.oalculation 
period. In this plan the calculation is made over a three month 
basis. However, a six-month moving average is used in the perfor--
mance calculation. Thus a bad month, or a good one will carry its 
impact for two incentive periods. The aforementioned American 
Seating Plan (Plan No.3) used for management, as well as for 
clerical workers, pays quarterly, although a cumulative yearly 
average is developed for the final payment. The ~arterly pay-
ments are only prepayments for the expected attainable earnings. 
Control 2! Earn1nss. In the anonymous management ino:enti ve, 
plan (Plan No. 19), just mentioned, performance for higher than 
102% does not receive any additional incentive pay. This control 
prevents looseness from being perpetuated, and management would 
request a budget tightening to achieve closer to standard 100% bud' 
get performance. But if management requests too much of a tight-
ening in order to obtain the big reward of 10% of a years pay for 
each 1% tightening, they will suffer in future achievement of the 
budget performance earnings. This plan has virtually unlimited 
ceilings in that improvements may always be made. The New Britain 
plan (Plan No. 17) also bas no limit to earnings, while the 
American Seating plan (Plan No.3) has limits of an equitable 
fifteen, twenty-five or thirty-f'i ve per cent based on tithe effect 
a man in a given job may have on costs: 
Generally, top management would consider its management groups 
'89 
honorable enough to achieve its earnings honestly for whatever the: 
motive for doing a job, desire to get ahead or for the extra money: 
the reward is nonetheless earned. 
Distribution 2! Incentive Earnings. The New Britain plan 
(Plan No. 17) for supervisors is the close4t to paying the indiv-
idual supervisor for his special efforts. If heh the one who 
has done a spectacular job, he's the one who should get the rewa 
The anonymous plan discussed pays the entlre management forc:e its 
bonus at the same percentage. Being based on budgets and not 
personalized performance factors, it recognizes that some budgets 
were tight and some loose when the plan was installed. It is 
intereating to note that no one seems to condemn those individuals 
whose departments have poor performance. Likewise, no one praises 
those individuals whose performance is high. Management knows 
that the budgets were not all perfeot when the plan was set up. 
In fact, if someone does do something outstanding to raise the 
total incentive performance, he is almost looked on as being a 
little foolish by his associates. This represents a grave differ-
ence of philosophies between management and factory workers in the 
discussion of individual or group incentives mentioned in Chapter 
III. Part of management's attitude in judging its associates in 
this company may stem from an otherwise insignificant expression 
in the incentive procedure manual, that "at the outset" the incent 
ive would pay the same performance to all members of management. 
Perhaps, top management will put the incentive on a departmental 
or individual basis when budget variations level out in time. 
CHAPTER V 
THE EFFECTS OF AUTOI~TION ON INDIRECT LABOR 
The effects of automation are a much discussed subject in 
recent years. Its effect on the indirect work force is just the 
opposite for office workers as it is for the indirect faotory 
workers. In the factory it is normally the direct workers, those 
who affect the quality or form of the product, who are effected. 
The processes of bringing material. in, maintenance, unloading 
machines, packing and shipping may not only continue to exist, but 
may increase manyfold due to the greater quantities of products 
that are being made. In a fully automatic plant, maintenance may 
be thee largest crew of them all. 
Even with fully electronic automation, where men moving parts 
trom station to station are elim1nated,1 trthe only loading and 
unloading required is at the beginn1ng and end of the production 
line embodied in the transfer ma.D.hine~2 The men who load at the 
beginning and unload at the end 40 not make the produot and are, 
therefor, indirect labor. Since "this stage of automation involve 
a higher degree of electronic control, and still fewer men", the 
1. Carl Dreher, Automation: What It Is, How It Works,,11ho 
.Q!!! !l!!. 11, (New York, 1957),. p. log:-- - - - - -
2. Automatic materials-handling machines are sometimes calle 
"transfer mach1nes~ 
3. Dreher, p. 19. 
JQ 
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ratio of indirect to direct has increased considerably. In fact 
in this fully automatic type of automation, such as exists in 
Detroit 1n automobile engine plants, there may be no d1rect labor. 
The man who operates the controls to make the product .. is making 
the product indirectly •. This is of course, a fine point allow-·-
ins personal interpretat10ns to ascerta1n if such automatic equ1p-
ment operators are direct or indirect labor. 
In the off1ce, automa.t1on has the effect of lessening the am-
ount of indirect labor that 1s required. Ted10us production con-
trol inventory record. keeping, can be performed on machines in a:-
fract10n of the t1me that is used by human beings. Billing, pay-
roll keeping, performance calcula~ing and machine 10ad1ng can all 
be done automatically, resulting in wide-spread reductions in 1n-
direct labor. Electronic marvels now under development will even 
take d1ctat10n and reproduce it in letter form at a cons1derably 
faster rate. nIt seems now almost certa1n that the secretary will 
not be seen in the office management of tomorrow:4 
Reductions of clerical workers are evidenced by such statis-
tics as, nin an insurance company studied by the Department of 
Labor, arlarge scale computer replaced 133 persons •.•• tl~ "An 
IBM-702 installed by the Bank of Amer1ca performs work equivalent 
4. Rolf Strehl, !h! Robots !!! Among Y!, (New York, 1955), 
p. 181. 
5. Geoz.-g1ana M •. Smith. Office Automation and White Collar 
Employment, (Rutgers, 1959) p. 12"citing Van AUken, in u. S. 
Government Pamphlet, p. 11. 
to 130 clerks • • "6 .. , thlrty-elght of these workers were re-
tralned to operate the machlne. "Erma, the same banks speclal 
purpose oomputer,.replaoes 86 olerks:7 
How about the nature of work that ls performed? "Aut omat 1 on 
promlses the ellmlnatlon of routlne, repetltlve jobs (In the fac-
tory). It makes posslble the oreatlon of greatly lmproved worklng 
oond1t1ons and the reduotlon 1n the length of the work weeks~8 
How do all of these facts effeot lncentlves for lnd1rect 
labor? In the oler1cal area we see posslbly more repet1 tl ve ef,.~: 
fort$ than ex1sted prevlously. Incentlve-wlse, this ls most ad-
vantageOus. Incentlves can be establlshed on the un1t of produc-
t10n that ls constantly" be1ng repeated as was the sltuat1on- ln 
a few of the P1tney Bowes jobs ment10ned earller. The seoretary 
who has the least repet1t1ve job of all, and thereby the most 
d1fflcult to measure, may oease to exlst and thereby reduce the 
number of unmeasured oocupatlons. Any of the plece-work type of 
1ncent1ves may be app11ed 1n suoh an automat1on offlce sltuatlon. 
In the factory where mater1al hand11ng 1s ooncerned, perfor-
mance may be judged on the basls of equlpment performanoes, where 
1f a maohlne has a oapaolty of a g1ven flgure, performanoe may be 
g1ven 1n relatlonsh1p to attainment of that flgure. Thus the 
6. Ibld., oltlng statement of A. Zip'l, Bank ot America, 
"Automatlon-and Reoent Trends: p. 82. 
7. Ibid., citlng H. B. Douglas speeoh to Inst1tute on Eleo--
tronlcs 1n-Minagement, ~~y, 1956. 
( 8~_~Labor Looks at Automatlon: AFL-GIO Publleation No.2l 'Ma,v l~..,o). P •. 21 .. 
relationship of output governed by 1nput st1ll has the human 
factor 1nvolved. 
Materials hand11ng, however, is probably the limiting 
factor in most cases. Despite oonsidemble technological 
development, there still is the problem of economio"ally 
moving materials around the plant, without human inter-
vention or assistanoe.9 
Maintenance is one of the major areas of indirect labor in 
the automated faotory •. Contrary to the belief of some, incentives: 
oan easily be applied to maintenance crews in the automated fao-
tory. In any incentive installation, the faotor of whether the 
end result justifies the expense must be considered. 
Where automation has baen employed, it has been done beoaus~ 
of a tremendous output of a repetitive ite~, thus the equipment 
and maintenance crew will continue to endure in suff1c1ent quan-
tities to justify the expend1tures"1nvolved in establishing a 
ma1ntenance inoentive. 
Several of the previously mentioned plans may be app11ed to 
cover automated equ1pment maintenance. 
In the development of automated equ1pment, wear points are 
recognized. Spare parts for these areas are always maintained 
for eitherper1od1c replaoement or emergency repairs as needed. 
One large steel company maintains incentive standards on a task 
list basis similar to that used in the previously mentioned U. S. 
Navy plan. Such items as changing the var10us rolls in rolling 
9.. IfAutomation--Threat or Promise~ ~ Reporter,. (May 1956) 
p.l. 
mills, re11n1ng hot metal equipment, changing roll table rollers, 
and furnace grate bars are measured on a per job bas1s. Methods 
for standards descr1be the number of men required, and the steps 
of the maintenance process wh1ch must be: gone through to effect an 
orderly convers10n of old parts to new. Bench work jobs, as used 
1n the Navy incentive would apply to a fully automatic plant 
complete w1th transfer equipment. Certain types of malntenance, 
though not 1ncluded in the standards, are s1milar to other Jobs 
for which there are standards. 
The Bay States Abras1ve Produots Company plan"which str1kes 
averages of maintenance work times, may be adopted"by determin1ng 
what sort of ma1ntenance jobs are done and observ1ng the time 
required for such jobs. This type of 1nc,ent1ve plan would contin-
ue to be effect1ve after equipment ages and requires more repairs. 
Although management may be unable to mainta1n a standard cost 
f1gure in the beg1nn1ng for the maintenance crew, 1t would know 
that so long as the maintenance crew 1s at 100% performance or 
better excessive maintenance hours are not being used. Doubtless-
ly, a trend of requirements for increas1ng ma1ntenance hours could 
be recognized. This would allow for budget1ng on the forecasted 
level of maintenance hours. Indeed, management could determine 
from this record the point at which existing eqUipment should be 
replaced as requir1ng too many repairs for economical operation. lO 
10. Delay records would complete this p1cture to reveal min-
imum economical operating acceptab1lity of equipment. 
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Thus 1t is seen that automat1on serves to cause stab111ty or 
use of more des1reable incentive yardsticks than existed for the 
occupations in the non-automated occupat1ons. Generally, the 
occupat10ns in which more repetit1ve work 1s performed, a lower 
job class1fication 1s found and there would be less resistance to 
the loss of d1gnity when work is performed under an incent1ve 
system. 
CHAPTER VI 
S~~Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
9'6 
It has been evidenced that many labor groups which are not 
normally considered as measurable for incentives are in reality 
very measurable. The illustrations portrayed in this study show 
how some companies handled the 1nstallation, development and ad-
ministration of their incent1ves for 1nd1rect labor. Although 
each incentive must be tailored to suit the individual situation, 
similarities of situations may be recognized to provide a key 
to tailoring other incentive applications. 
Basically, the nonna! incentive rules may be followed where,_ 
the jobs to be measured, whether clerical or houl'ly" are repeti---
tive. Any method of study and establishing rates may be used. 
However, when studying clerical groups, great care must be exer--
cised to recognize the dignity or social status of the group. 
Because of tradition, the Industrial Engineer cannot just walk in 
and clock such groups. He must be 1ntroduced into the group and 
give a full explanation of what he intends to do. 
In the chapter on clerical incentives, the author bas discus-
sed incentives to cover nearly every type of offioe group. In 
the more repetitive types of occupations, direct types of measure-
ments were shown. Counts of production were entered by the indiv-
idual worker to later be calculated by the accounting group. 
Another company measured its clerical group in a budget performanoe 
9rt 
type of plan allowing various maximum performances based on the 
extent to which the individuals contributed to controlling costs. 
While appearing similar to profit sharing at a quick glance, a 
closer look reveals that a plant may continue to 9perate well 
within its budgets when sales, and thereby profits, are sharply 
reduced. 
The chapter on hourly jobs in the factory covered a Wide 
variety of jobs. Incentives were mentioned either in detail or 
briefly for every indirect function surrounding the direct prod-
uction of a company •. Janitors, material handler, set-up men, pac~ 
ing and shipping workers, and maintenance, to name a few, were 
discussed in Chapter III. Both direct aDd indirect types of 
measurement were used. Methods of establish1llg:.s~andards ranged 
from the use of detailed predetermined standard time values throu~ 
s.top watch, estimates, relationships to direct hours, and histor-
ioal data. Incent! ves were shown that did mt differ Significantly 
from piece work type incentives, in that they paid incentive on 
work related to the number of. units handled. The large scale 
utility incentive with its scaled up standards to cover lowere 
levels of plant activity looks very much like a gift. Perhaps its 
yield in some areas of more work from the worker is not as great 
as one would like. But a fixed station operator could still, by 
closer scrutiny of his eqUipment, and additional preventive 
maintenance, and even performance of a few simple maintenance 
chores, contribute to better efficiency and plant operation. 
Further,. by the use of incentives in this area, since most other 
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area.s are covered, the company is able to avoid distorting ita: 
job evaluation program. If jobs we,re to be given a ra1se 1n pay 
for not be1ng able to earn 1ncent1ves, 1n time they may be tw1sted 
around to sound as though other workers are paid less when they 
can earn 1ncent1ve. Thus, there is no 1ncentive at all, a work-
er would feel that he has to work at an 1ncent1ve pace just to 
get what is com1ns to h1m. 
Incent1ves should attempt to reward the better performance 
as soon as poss1ble after the work 1s performed. This would mean 
rewards should come8at the same t1me as the pay check for the 
per10d worked. However, where performances vary w1dely due to 
condit1ons of fluctuat10ns or the nature of the work that is done, 
incentive payments may be levelled over an extended per10d o~ time 
The per10d should be just long enough to el1m1nate the severe 
peaks~ and valleys. The further the reward 1s from the effort, 
the less effect 1t has on caus1ng better future performance. 
Although, 1n the Bay States Abras1ve Products ma1ntenance plan, 
be1ng based on a per job measurement, 1t 1s possible that a very 
long job may be worked on w1th the greatest effort, yet the job 
count would be small and earn1ngs would be low. Th1s plan levels 
performance out for several weeks by moving averages to elim1nate 
that P9ss1bi11ty.c 
Earnings should be distributed equally to all members of the 
same crew in hourly 1ndirect crew 1ncent1ves. Certa1n workers, 
such as group leaders may do more organizing of work than actual 
work itself, but they contribute nonetheless to performance. In 
± 
fact, 1f they have planned carefully, the1r oontr1bution may be 
of most s1gnif1cant importanoe. 
Management must not be forgotten in the 1ncentive p1cture~ 
Just the payment of high wages does not give a company its best 
dollars worth in management labor. The management incentive is 
very important. It ensures more careful training, both by 
higher supervisors and by the individuals themselves to enable 
better performance to be made on the management incentive; the 
management incentives provide the yardstick which will measure how 
good the management team is. 
Other techniques which are not readily eategorized as incent-
ives, are stock option plans. These are more or less attempts to 
appeal to the self survival instinct. By making the employees a 
stookholder, it 1s hoped that he will work harder to make his 
stock more valuable. Also, the method by whioh stock may be 
given, may enoourage less employee turnover. 
The Un1ted States Steel Corporat1on has a stock opt1on plan 
for all non-un1on employees. Th1s plan pays fifty cents for each 
employee dollar to be vested after the third year. Employees may 
save from one to eight per cent of the1r salary depend1ng on the1r 
length of service and/or the1r status. This plan, having the t~ 
year vestment clause assures longer tenure of employment.. If a 
worker leaves before his third year, he does not receive any of 
the company's share. The employee~ dollar may be invested, all or 
fifty per cent in U. S. Government bonds or bond issues, and up to 
fifty per cent in company stock. The company's share will be in 
7 
company stock. All stock is bought at the current market price. 
Other companies give employees options to buy a certain 
amount of stock at a greatly reduced rate. Top executives are 
often given stock options to make the position more invitlna as 
well as making him an important shareholder to insure greater 
interest in the company. 
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Automation has been seen to provide a greater degree of 
repetitiveness in many office operations and cause an inoreasecin 
the ratio of indirect to direct labor in the factory. The la·tte:c. 
1s oaused by the fact that it is the product1on phases that are 
displaced by automation in the factory. Also, more equ1Pment me~ 
more ma.intenance is required. 
Incentives for indirect labor will gain 1ncreasing prominance 
in industry and businesses in years to oome. Management is always 
seeking to find new ways to meet the ever increas1ng threat of 
competition and new products. Modern~day.work simplifiaation says. 
tha~ there is always a better way to do a job. ~~nagement is 
looking for this way. With the extensive coverage of direct 
labor, management in now turning its Industrial Engineer's efforts 
toward meaSuring the indirects. 
r 
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